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I
INTRODUCTION
One year after the tenth anniversary of the International Criminal Court
(ICC or Court), it is almost impossible for the international legal scholar not to
1
come across one of the many “stock takings” and assessments of the Court’s
2
juridical performance so far, its achievements, impact, and challenges. This
development is highly fortunate because it creates the necessary momentum to
galvanize further support for the Court, even from the many skeptics who
predicted the Court would die an unnoticed and uneventful death within a
3
couple years of its creation. With its current 122 States Parties, the Court has
4
come a long way since its inception with the sixtieth ratification in 2002. Global
support seems to be growing slowly yet steadily, with thirteen accessions since
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1. By the authors’ request, the journal has agreed to deviate from conventional citation practice
by capitalizing references to the Court, the States Parties, the Court’s principal organs, and other
entities capitalized in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The States Parties referred to
are the same as those referenced in the Rome Statute, supra, at pmbl., arts. 86–112.
2. A number of conferences have taken stock of the Court at its tenth anniversary. For example,
a conference by the Grotius Center of International Legal Studies on September 26–27, 2012 in The
Hague (“The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and
Challenges”), and two conferences by the Academy Nuremberg Principles and Wayamo Foundation,
on October 4–5, 2012 in Nuremberg (“Through the Lens of Nuremberg: The International Criminal
Court at its Tenth Anniversary”), and on November 7–8, 2013 also in Nuremberg (“Building a Legacy –
Lessons Learnt from the Offices of the Prosecutors of International Criminal Tribunals and Hybrid
Courts”).
3. See Christian Wenaweser, H.E. Ambassador, The Int’l Criminal Court after Ten Years –
Achievements and Challenges (Mar. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.regierung.li/fileadmin/
dateien/botschaften/ny_dokumente/2012-03-21_Marrett_lecture_McGill_Univeristy_Montreal_02.pdf).
4. See Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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only 2010. However, in this article we do not intend to examine the Court’s
performance, achievements, or shortcomings as a central player on the scene of
international criminal justice. Rather, we will take a critical look behind the
scenes of the Court, focusing on its institutional and administrative framework
as an institution that is striving to become “[a] [m]odel of [p]ublic
5
[a]dministration.”
In order to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the Court’s structure, as
well as the approach taken by its senior management and stakeholders when
fundamental decisions had to be made, we begin this article with a brief
overview of the Court’s institutional and administrative structure and a
discussion of the relationship of the principal organs of the Court to one
another. Subsequently, we discuss a small selection of elemental topics—most
prominently among them the Court’s financial management—with a view to
evaluating the extent to which the members of the institution have been able to
learn from their initial mistakes and revamp the Court’s operations into those
of an efficient and effective international criminal justice mechanism.
II
MANAGERIAL PRACTICES
The Court, like any other institution of comparable size and structure,
heavily relies on managerial practices that have evolved over the past eleven
years of its existence. Its administrative framework has developed in response
to the growing demands of administrative regulation, in particular through
6
Presidential Directives, Administrative Instructions, and Information Circulars.
The Court’s practices, be they in conjunction with governing administrative
norms or in the absence of any formal codification, remain a major driver of the
Court’s managerial dynamics.
In the abstract, managerial practices can best be described as the recurrent
7
performances of material activities. In a given normative and hierarchical
framework, these routine contributions and activities serve to define the
average scope and structure of operations, as well as relevant modi operandi.
Managerial practices always stand in a specific relationship to the normative

5. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., Nov. 23–Dec. 1,
2006, Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 39, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/5/6 (Aug. 4, 2006)
[hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Previous Strategic Plan], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-6_English.pdf. In early 2013, the ICC issued its revised
Strategic Plan 2013–2017, in which it defined as part of its mission to “[b]e administratively transparent,
efficient and accountable.” Int’l Criminal Court, Tripartite Committee, International Criminal Court
Strategic Plan 2013–2017, at 2 (Apr. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Strategic Plan 2013–
2017], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/registry/ICC-Strategic-Plan-2013-2017-190413.pdf.
6. See Vademecum of Administrative Issuances, INT’L CRIM. COURT (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/vademecum/Pages/default.aspx
(“provid[ing] the Court with a tool compiling all administrative issuances”).
7. DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK, AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 3f
(2012).
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framework in which operations are carried out. They define the relationship
between (formal) rules and (informal) practices in a given operative context.
The more detailed the normative framework that regulates the pertinent
procedures and administrative structures, the more limited the scope for the
development of practices that are not a mere mise en oeuvre of the authoritative
legal context, but rather a pragmatic solution to a recurrent operational
challenge. In particular, heavily hierarchical management structures with a
strong concentration of decision-making resting upon a comparatively limited
number of governing leaders will rely on governance structures that leave little
space for the development of pragmatic practices. Examples of this can be
found in the military.
However, where a governance structure is newly established it is highly
unlikely that a comprehensive normative framework regulates all of its
operations and processes in sufficient detail. Although this may be regarded as
a deficiency from a purely security-oriented managerial standpoint (because not
all processes are yet fully regulated and un- or underregulated processes can
lead to disruptions of the system), from an efficiency-oriented standpoint it also
represents a window of opportunity for good—and inventive—management. If
and when senior and midlevel management become aware of gaps in the
governance structure of a new program entailing a number of unforeseeable
managerial challenges, leadership will be alert to possible problems. When a
problem surfaces, the management will have the liberty to find a pragmatic,
dynamic, and efficient solution and thus establish a practice tailored to the
challenge and unimpeded by a preexisting normative framework; a preexisting
framework may at times even represent an obstacle to the most effective and
efficient solution to a given operational challenge.
Moreover, managerial practices can develop even in (partial) contradiction
to the governing regulatory framework when that framework in fact poses an
obstacle to efficient and effective management. In such cases the challenge is
not so much in establishing the accurate and conducive practice but rather in
speedily and transparently amending the normative framework to match the
management practice—provided that this practice is indeed more appropriate.
In contrast, the promulgation of a certain legal or administrative framework can
be a means to rectify a prior erroneous managerial practice. In fact, codifying
previous managerial practice is a golden opportunity for the senior
management of an organization to optimize and amend the previous practice in
some of its aspects. Finally, it must be emphasized that the balance between
systematic regulatory codification and rigid managerial practice on the one
hand, and flexible managerial practice within a more strategic administrative
framework on the other, needs to be calibrated on a case-by-case basis by
considering the specific mandate, field of operations, and general framework of
the organization. As such, it can be safely said that the ICC’s status as the first
permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over individuals
accused of the worst international crimes makes it a truly unique institution
operating within an equally unique setting of internal and external mandates
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and responsibilities.
At the outset, the ICC’s administrative structure in many essential areas
such as human resources, procurement, and internal oversight was at best
rudimentary, if not downright nonexistent. The Court’s principal legal sources,
the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and its Rules of Procedure and
8
Evidence (RPE), contain only limited guidance and instead mandate that the
9
organs of the Court issue secondary legal texts governing the institutional
administrative structure. For example, article 44, paragraph 3 of the Rome
Statute tasks the Registrar to draft staff regulations containing the fundamental
conditions of service and the basic rights and obligations of the staff of the
Court. Another crucially important set of rules is contained in the Regulations
of the Court, whose adoption pursuant to article 52, paragraph 1 of the Rome
10
Statute falls within the judges’ competence. Other essential texts governing
important areas of the institution’s management fall within the remit of
competence of the Court’s constitutive body, the Assembly of States Parties
11
(ASP or Assembly). The Court’s Financial Regulations and Rules (FRR), as
12
well as its Independent Oversight Mechanism, are just two examples of such
8. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 21(1)(a); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States
Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records, pt. II.A., ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept.
9, 2002) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, RPE], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenc
eEng.pdf (setting forth the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence), as amended by Int’l Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, Amendment of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICCASP/11/Res.2 (Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, RPE Amendment], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/ iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-Res2-ENG.pdf.
9. The “organs” of the Court are defined as the Presidency, the judicial Divisions, the Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP), and the Registry. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 34. However, for
managerial and financial purposes, and therefore also for the purpose of this article, the Presidency
represents the Judicial Divisions. See, e.g., Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess.,
May 17–28, 2004, Regulations of the Court, regulation 3(1), ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004)
[hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court], available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/
Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf (setting forth the ICC’s regulations on internal
representation); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for
2014 of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 53, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/12/10 (July 29, 2013) [hereinafter
Int’l Criminal Court, Proposed Programme Budget for 2014], available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-10-ENG.pdf (external representation in administrative as
well as financial matters).
10. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9.
11. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records,
ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, FRR], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/publications/compendium/Compendium.4th.07.ENG.pdf. The
ICC FRR are to be “adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art.
113.
12. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 112(4). For the latest progress on the matter, see Int’l
Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Report of the Bureau on the
Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/27 (Nov. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-27-ENG.pdf;
Int’l
Criminal
Court,
Assembly of States Parties, Independent Oversight Mechanism, Res. 4, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/Res.4
(Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11Res4-ENG.pdf; Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, II
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texts.
Upon the Court’s commencement of operations, its principals (namely, the
President, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar) had the challenging task of first
drafting and then adopting the major administrative legislation containing
13
guidelines of common interorgan importance such as the Staff Regulations, as
well as legal texts governing matters of a more organ-specific nature, such as the
14
Regulations of the Registry and the Regulations of the Office of the
15
Prosecutor. At the same time, the multitude of everyday challenges of both an
intraorgan and interorgan nature led to the rapid development of managerial
practices in a more-or-less-coordinated fashion. Many of these practices in fact
represented major sources for ensuing codification. One of the benefits of
managerial practice is that it not only has the potential to generate a viable
framework for repetitive practice, but also has the flexibility to manage new
16
challenges by way of adaption and escalation structures. These structures
usually result out of ad hoc solutions that, in hindsight, have proven to be
accurate and effective, or that indicate the need for improvement. In this way,
17
managerial practice can function as a “lessons learnt” exercise allowing for a
transition from managerial “ad hocism” to a codification of structures. The ICC
has made use of this practice not only in the aforementioned regulations and
18
rules, but also in the development of an increasing network of administrative
issuances.
In 2003, the Presidency of the Court issued its first Presidential Directive,
19
stipulating the Procedures for the Promulgation of Administrative Issuances. It

Official Records, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/20 (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/OR/ICC-ASP-11-20-VolII-ENG.pdf.
13. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 2d Sess., Sept. 8–12, 2003, Staff Regulations,
ICC
Doc.
ICC-ASP/2/Res.2
(Sept.
12,
2003),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/3119BD70-DFB6-4B8C-BC173019CC1D0E21/140182/Staff_Regulations_120704EN.pdf.
14. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Regulations of the Registry, ICC Doc. ICCBD/03-01-06-Rev.1 (Sept. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Registry],
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A57F6A7F-4C20-4C11-A61F-759338A3B5D4/140149/
ICCBD_030106_English1.pdf (pursuant to rule 14 of the ICC RPE).
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 42(2); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties,
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, regulation 9, ICC Doc. ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD6-40B5-9CDA-792BCBE1E695/
280253/ICCBD050109ENG.pdf [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Office of the
Prosecutor].
16. See NICOLINI, supra note 7, at 5–6.
17. See Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Study Group
on Governance: Lessons Learnt: First Report of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties, § I, ICC
Doc. ICC-ASP/11/31/Add.1 (Oct. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Study Group Lessons
Learnt Report 2012], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-31-Add1ENG.pdf.
18. The Regulations of the Registry, supra note 14, were only entered into force on March 6, 2006,
almost four years after the commencement of the Court’s operations; further, the Regulations of the
Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 15, were issued only on April 23, 2009.
19. Int’l Criminal Court, President, Procedures for the Promulgation of Administrative Issuances,
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clarified that the Court’s administrative issuances may be promulgated as (1)
Presidential Directives, (2) Administrative Instructions, or (3) Information
20
Circulars. General rules, procedures, and policies—which would arguably
include the essence of managerial practices developed over time—may only be
21
established by either Presidential Directives or Administrative Instructions. As
a fundamental feature of all administrative issuances, proper consultation
amongst the organs and all major organizational units concerned is required for
22
their promulgation. In the ten years since then, a multitude of administrative
issuances has been promulgated in as many as seventeen broad categories
governing the Court’s administration, from human-resources issues to
professional conduct, disciplinary issues, security, procurement, rules applicable
23
in field duty stations, and so on.
However, despite these efforts to map its administrative framework, the
Court has developed and maintained a number of important managerial
practices in its operations that are not necessarily fully mapped and mirrored by
administrative texts. These practices are testimony to the organs’ interpretation
of the ICC’s normative framework on both the interorgan and organ-specific
levels. In the following parts of this article, assessments of the Court’s
underlying administrative structure and institutional arrangements will be
followed by brief subparts analyzing how managerial practices have (1)
developed alongside, in contrast to, or in the absence of a normative
framework, and (2) impacted the institution’s operations.
III
THE COURT’S INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE UNDER
SCRUTINY
Unlike the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals of the United Nations
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (the ICTY and ICTR, respectively, or
the ad hoc Tribunals if mentioned together), the Court is based on an
24
international treaty, the Rome Statute. The Court is thus not a UN organ, let
alone a product of UN Security Council measures pursuant to Chapter VII of
25
the UN Charter, as were the UN ad hoc Tribunals. However, the Court

ICC Doc. ICC/PRESD/G/2003/001 (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/
icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/vademecum/PD/Procedures%20for%20the%20Promulgation%20o
f%20Administrative%20Issuances.PDF.
20. Id. § 1.1.
21. Id. § 1.2.
22. Id. §§ 2.4, 3.3, 5.
23. For a comprehensive overview of (1) Staff Regulations, (2) Staff Rules, (3) Financial
Regulations and Rules, (4) Presidential Directives, (5) Administrative Instructions, (6) Information
Circulars, and (7) other relevant policies and guidelines, see the Court’s Vademecum of Administrative
Issuances,
INT’L CRIM. COURT
(Oct.
30,
2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
legal%20texts%20and%20tools/vademecum/Pages/default.aspx
24. See Rome Statute, supra note 1.
25. See S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]
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cooperates quite closely with a number of UN agencies, in particular with
regard to its field operations in the current eight situation countries.
Furthermore, the Court and the UN have issued a “relationship agreement”
26
governing the legal ties between the two international organizations. Another
quite remarkable difference remains between the Court and the UN ad hoc
Tribunals, both vis-à-vis their stakeholders and in front of third parties from
whom judicial or prosecutorial cooperation measures are sought: In the case of
the ad hoc Tribunals, every UN member state is one of the Tribunals’
stakeholders. When UN member states are asked to cooperate with the
Tribunals, articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter bind them to do so. Even in
the case of conflicting duties under international treaties, the obligations under
27
the UN Charter prevail. By contrast, States Parties to the Rome Statute are
bound only by weaker statutory provisions, such as articles 86 et sequentes of
the Rome Statute, by virtue of the general international legal principle of pacta
sunt servanda, as enshrined in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
28
of Treaties of 1969. In case the state whose assistance is sought has conflicting
obligations under international law, the Rome Statute proves a far less powerful
tool to enforce state cooperation than the UN Charter, as article 98 of the
29
Rome Statute illustrates.
From the treaty-based nature of the Court, as well as its relative
independence from the UN system, flows its liberty to adopt an administrative
framework that does not mirror existing UN agencies, suborgans, or otherwise
related bodies. On the other hand, with liberty comes responsibility—and with a
multilateral founding treaty comes diversity of opinions, interests,
administrative cultures, and philosophies. The Rome Statute has been described
30
as a “unique compromise” between the many different legal traditions that
31
sought to influence the Rome Statute in one way or another. A similar

(establishing the ICTR); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute] (establishing the ICTY).
26. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Negotiated Relationship Agreement Between
the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, Res. 1, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1 (Apr. 10,
2004),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP3-Res-01ENG.pdf.
27. U.N. Charter art. 103.
28. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
29. For a discussion regarding the possible inapplicability of article 98(1) of the Statute with
regard to immunities of heads of states, see Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to
Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender
of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1384955.pdf;
Dapo Akande, ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (. . . At long Last . . . ) But Gets the
Law Wrong, EJIL: TALK! BLOG EURO. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issuesdetailed-decision-on-bashir%E2%80%99s-immunity-at-long-last-but-gets-the-law-wrong/.
30. See Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy
of a Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 603, 603 (2003).
31. Most prominently, a steady tension between those states favoring the inquisitorial approach to
criminal legal doctrine and other states defending the adversarial approach continued to complicate
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assessment can be made of the Court’s institutional and administrative
structure. Although certain elements of the UN, such as the United Nations
Common System on Salaries and Entitlements, have been adopted or
incorporated into the ICC’s framework, the Court has gone in a new direction
as regards its structure of administrative issuances. It has thus diverged in a
number of aspects from one of its most natural points of reference, the ICTY
across town.
A. Administrative Structure and Institutional Challenges
The Court has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression32 committed by individuals
after July 1, 2002, at which point the Rome Statute entered into force.33 For the
Court to exercise its jurisdiction, one or more statutory crimes must have either
been committed in the territory of a State Party, or by a national of a State
Party.34 Further, the Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed after July 1,
2002 in those situations referred to it by the UN Security Council regardless of
any territorial or personal restriction.35 Finally, under the Court’s principle of
complementarity, a case is inadmissible before the Court if it is being or has
already been investigated or prosecuted in a state with jurisdiction over the
crime(s) of the individual(s), unless that state is “unwilling or unable genuinely
36
to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”
The general structure of the Court broadly follows the logic applied by the
37
38
UN Security Council when setting up the ICTY in 1994, the ICTR in 1995,
39
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in 2001, or any other

negotiations leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute. See Morten Bergsmo & Frederik Harhoff,
Article 42: The Office of the Prosecutor, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 971, 973, ¶ 6 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]; Otto Triffterer, Preliminary Remarks: The
Permanent International Criminal Court – Ideal and Reality, in COMMENTARY, supra, at 15, 18, ¶ 6;
GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ¶ 366 (2d ed. 2009).
32. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5. For the future activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over
the latter crime, see Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, May 31–June 11, 2010, Resolution
RC/Res.6, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 11(1) & 126.
34. Id. at art. 13.
35. Id. at art. 13(b).
36. Id. at arts. 1 & 17.
37. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
38. ICTR Statute, supra note 25.
39. The SCSL was established by an agreement between the United Nations and the government
of Sierra Leone, U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 6, 2002 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, attachment, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, art. 11 (Jan. 16,
2002) [hereinafter SCSL Statute], as mandated by S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14,
2000). It is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
since November 30, 1996. Id.
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40

international(ized) criminal courts : A separation between the judiciary
(comprised of the Chambers and the Presidency), the Office of the Prosecutor
41
(OTP), and the Registry. The Prosecutor is independent from the other organs
of the Court, a feature that is common among all international(ized) courts and
42
43
tribunals. The Registry operates as the service provider to both, assisting with
general administrative services, courtroom support, and witness- (and victim-)
protection matters in ongoing judicial proceedings and (to a lesser degree)
during the investigations by the Prosecutor.
However, the Court differs from the UN ad hoc Tribunals in a number of
respects, which create certain knock-on effects for the institutional framework.
Furthermore, due to the Court’s unique structure and features, managerial
practices have formed and developed in a different manner, giving the
institution a different “spin” altogether.
1. The Role of the Organs and Their Relationship to One Another
a. The role of the President and Presidency. First, the Court consists of
44
four organs: the Presidency, the judicial divisions, the OTP, and the Registry.
This contrasts with the ad hoc Tribunals as well as the SCSL in that the
President and the Presidency receive a considerably more prominent role in the
Court’s institutional framework. Or, to be more precise, that the Court consists
of a fourth organ, the Presidency, which represents a novel institutional
45
arrangement. Two distinct relationships merit specific attention in that regard,
namely (1) the relationship between the Presidency and the President; and (2)
the relationship between the President/Presidency on the one hand and the
other organs of the Court on the other.
(1) The relationship between the Presidency and the President. Article
38 of the Rome Statute is the only statutory provision that explicitly mentions
both the Presidency and the President, and it puts them into an institutional
relationship. In particular, it stipulates that the Presidency consists of the
46
President as well as a first and second Vice President. Further, it outlines the

40. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute]
(establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)).
41. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 34; ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10; ICTY Statute,
supra note 25, at art. 11; SCSL Statute, supra note 39, at art. 11. For an example of another
international(ized) court, see STL Statute, supra note 40, at art. 7.
42. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, art. 6, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter ECCC Statute] (establishing, pursuant
to G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (May 22, 2003), the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and, in article 6, declaring that “co-prosecutors shall be independent”);
STL Statute, supra note 40, at art. 11(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 15; ICTY Statute, supra
note 25, at art. 16; SCSL Statute, supra note 39, at art. 15(1). Note, however, that article 53 of the Rome
Statute provides the Pre-Trial Chamber’s with a (limited) power to review a decision of the Prosecutor
not to proceed with an investigation. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 53(3).
43. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10; ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 11.
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responsibilities of the Presidency in its paragraph 3: “(a) [t]he proper
administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor;
and (b) [t]he other functions conferred upon it in accordance with [the Rome]
47
Statute.” In particular, the first prong of paragraph 3, the proper
administration of the Court, is filled with life in a number of provisions in the
48
Court’s RPE. Pursuant to rule 4 bis(2), the Presidency decides on the
49
assignment of judges to judicial divisions. Rule 8 provides that the Presidency
50
is to draw up a draft code of professional conduct for counsel before the Court.
Pursuant to rule 12, the Presidency prepares the election of the Registrar; it
approves the Regulations of the Registry in accordance with rule 14. The
Presidency also receives complaints in disciplinary proceedings and decides on
the imposition of disciplinary measures for judges, the Registrar, and the deputy
51
registrar. The list of the Presidency’s administrative duties is long.
An insight into the Presidency’s internal decision-making procedure can be
found in the Regulations of the Court, a legal text containing the administrative
and procedural provisions for the proper application of the Statute and Rules.
Pursuant to article 52 of the Statute, it is for the judges of the Court to establish
52
the Regulations. Regulation 11 stipulates that the members of the Presidency
44. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 34.
45. The ad hoc Tribunals only have a President who does not represent a separate organ of the
Tribunals but is a member of the Chambers. See ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 13; ICTY Statute,
supra note 25, at art. 14; see also SCSL Statute, supra note 39, at art. 11.
46. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 38(3). The Presidency is elected by the plenary of the
judges. Id. at art. 38(1).
47. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 38. Lastly, article 38 of the Rome Statute provides that in
case the President is unavailable or disqualified from a case pursuant to article 41, the First Vice
President shall act in place of the President, and in case of the unavailability of the latter, the Second
Vice President is to take over. Id.
48. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8.
49. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 39(1). Note that the ICC RPE was only recently
amended to include rule 4 bis. See Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Amendments to
Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Res. 1, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/10/Res.1 (Dec. 20, 2011)
[hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Amendments to Rule 4], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-10-Res.1-ENG.pdf.
50. Rule 8 of the ICC RPE provides that the draft code is based on a proposal prepared by the
Registrar; the draft code is then submitted to the ASP and adopted in accordance with article 112(7) of
the Rome Statute. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8.
51. Other presidential administrative duties are contained in rule 37(1) (addressing a judge’s
resignation), rule 41 (regarding the working languages of the Court), and rule 21(3) (providing that the
Presidency reviews the Registrar’s decision on the assignment of counsel). Int’l Criminal Court, RPE,
supra note 8. However, the Presidency’s review of administrative decisions issued by the Registrar is
not counted among the presidential administrative functions; it is rather a judicial function of the
Presidency which falls under article 38(3)(b) of the Rome Statute, supra note 1. Lastly, rules 211–222
vest the Presidency with several tasks regarding the enforcement of sentences, fines, forfeiture
measures and reparation orders, and supervision and transfer of convicts. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE,
supra note 8; see also Jules Deschênes & Christopher Staker, Article 38: The Presidency, in
COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 951, 953, ¶ 6.
52. Pursuant to rule 4(5) of the ICC RPE, supra note 8, the Regulations are adopted by the judges
of the ICC in plenary sessions. However, unlike at the UN ad hoc Tribunals, the judges of the Court
cannot adopt rules of procedure and evidence themselves. Article 51 of the Rome Statute, supra note 1,
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shall attempt to achieve unanimity in any decision made in the course of
carrying out their responsibilities under article 38(3) of the Statute, and that,
53
failing unanimity, such decision shall be made by majority.
In contrast to the role defined in the Statute, Rules, and Regulations of the
Court for the Presidency, the Statute confers an equally prominent role on the
President in that pursuant to article 43(2) of the Statute, the Registrar shall
exercise his or her functions as principal administrative officer of the Court
54
“under the authority of the President of the Court.” This provision stands in
direct tension to article 38(3)(a), which places the proper administration of the
Court into the hands of the Presidency. Further, pursuant to regulation 11(1) of
the Regulations of the Court, the Presidency has authority to overrule the
President on questions within the regulatory scope of article 38(3)(a). However,
article 43(2) vests the President with the sole authority to oversee the
Registrar’s functions—an activity which prima facie falls squarely within the
55
remit of the “proper administration of the Court.”
How to resolve this ambiguity between two provisions in the same
(founding) document of the Court? To interpret the term “the President of the
Court” in article 43(2) to be synonymous with “the Presidency of the Court”
would be inaccurate, because it would not take into account that the President
56
has additional personal functions elsewhere in the Statute. Also, the logic of
article 38(1) and (2) of the Statute would be negated if the President had no
genuine functions linked to his title. Another interpretation could be that the
only administrative duties that fall within the remit of the Presidency are those
that are directly assigned to the Presidency in the Court’s founding texts, such
as where the latter make explicit reference to “the Presidency.” This
interpretation, however, would stand in conflict with the wording of article
38(3) of the Statute, which defines the Presidency’s responsibilities as the
proper administration of the Court and other functions conferred upon it in
accordance with the Statute. The reference to the proper administration of the
Court would be devoid of any content if only those functions explicitly
indicated in the Statute fell within the Presidency’s competence.
It would appear that the judges of the Court were guided by noble concerns
when they drafted regulation 11, probably intending to constrain the President
by requiring the Presidency to make all decisions by majority. However, the

clarifies that the ASP adopts the Court’s RPE. Cf. STL Statute, supra note 40, at art. 28; ICTR Statute,
supra note 25, at art. 14; ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 15; SCSL Statute, supra note 39, at art.
14(2) (adopting own rules of procedure and evidence).
53. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9.
54. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 43(2) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at art. 38(3)(a).
56. See articles 2 and 3 of the Rome Statute, pursuant to which the President, on the Court’s
behalf, concludes the Relationship Agreement with the United Nations as well as the Headquarters
Agreement with the Host State. Id. at arts. 2 & 3. Further, pursuant to article 112(5) of the Rome
Statute, “the President [. . .] may participate, as appropriate, in meetings of the Assembly and of the
Bureau.” Id. at art. 112(5) (emphasis added).
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Statute remains nebulous when one attempts to discern which of the Court’s
administrative duties would require a majority decision of the Presidency
pursuant to article 38(3) of the Statute, and which of the duties would be within
the President’s exclusive remit of authority pursuant to article 43(2). Article
43(1) of the Statute describes the Registrar’s scope of responsibility as the
“non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court.” These
aspects, however, would appear to be encompassed in the general term of the
57
“proper administration of the Court,” thus providing no conclusive guidance.
Yet a drafting suggestion at the Preparatory Committee to the Rome Statute
which spelled out the Presidency’s “supervision and direction of the Registrar”
was finally rejected and the matter was settled in today’s article 43(2), providing
58
for the President’s authority, rather than the Presidency’s. This historic fact
allows for the conclusion that a certain ambit of the Registrar’s responsibilities
was intended to remain in the President’s sole authority, rather than
automatically the Presidency’s oversight.
In practice, the ideal effect of this classic example of statutory-provision
ambiguity may simply be that the Presidency will discuss the matter and come
to a strategic solution agreeable to all members of the Presidency regarding
which of the Registrar’s core functions fall under the President’s sole authority
and which items would be within the Presidency’s remit under article 38(3)(a).
The potential for gridlock, however, is real. Thus, one could ask whether Court
regulation 11(1) does not in fact contravene article 43(2) of the Statute if the
latter were to be read in a way that the President’s authority under article 43(2)
is merely part of the general administrative oversight exercised by the
Presidency and thus subject to majority ruling. In this case regulation 11(1), and
with it the majority voting arrangement, would contradict the wording of article
43(2) speaking of the President’s (not Presidency’s) authority and thus be
59
inapplicable as the “inferior” legal norm. However, the wording of regulation
11(1), referring to article 38(3) alone (and not article 43(2)) would rather seem
to support the solution that article 43(2) contains an ambit under the
President’s sole authority. Only the content of that ambit remains unclear.
Managerial practice within the Presidency has led to a pragmatic solution of
the issue. Periodic meetings between the President and the Registrar serve as a
platform for the Registrar to seek strategic guidance on all those nonjudicial
aspects of the Court’s administration that merit the President’s awareness.
Separately, periodic meetings between the President and his two VicePresidents provide an independent forum to discuss matters that concern the

57. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 38(3)(a).
58. Deschênes & Staker, supra note 51, at 952, ¶ 5 (citing Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the
Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Mar. 25–Apr. 12 and Aug. 12–30, 1996, Vol. I, U.N. Doc.
A/51/22 (Vol. I); GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22 (1996).
59. Pursuant to article 21(1)(a), the Statute as the principal legal instrument adopted by the States
Parties takes precedence over other applicable legal texts such as the Regulations of the Court, which
are a creation of the judges of the Court. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 52(1).
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proper administration of the Court. Issues discussed in the first forum may be
brought to the other for further discussion and vice versa. Staff of the Office of
the President render advice in both fora and support the President, as well as
the Presidency, where necessary. This transparent and dynamic practice has in
fact achieved a sound harmony between articles 38(3)(a) and 43(2). It connects
the rather active duty of the Presidency (who “shall be responsible”) with the
passive role of the President (for whom the Registrar acts, albeit “under the
authority of the President”) through a flexible arrangement guided by effective
and efficient communication between all concerned. Furthermore, the
involvement of Presidency staff in the principals’ communication and
coordination guarantees that institutional knowledge can be passed from the
60
outgoing to the incoming Presidency every three years. This in turn provides
for continuity and minimal disruption after each changing of the guard. Finally,
the current managerial practice is of such a straightforward nature that its
codification would threaten overregulation more than it would promise to
provide legal certainty when there is none.
(2) The relationship between the Presidency and the Judicial Divisions.
The judicial divisions consist of eighteen judges organized into the Pre-Trial
61
Division, the Trial Division, and the Appeals Division. Judges are assigned to
the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions for a period of three years, but remain there
62
until the completion of any case that has already commenced. The Appeals
Division is composed of the President of the Court and four other judges. The
Trial Division and the Pre-Trial Division have at least six judges each. The
judges assigned to the Appeals Division serve exclusively in that division for
63
their entire term of office.
Apart from the fact that the Presidency consists of members of the judicial
divisions, the Presidency as such has practically no material role to play in
deciding the merits of ongoing judicial proceedings before the chambers—with
the exception of the judicial review of administrative decisions of the Registrar.
This may have a certain effect on the administrative aspects of a case before the
Court, depending on the subject of contention. Issues include detention
conditions of a detained accused, issues dealing with his or her legal
representation, or any other administrative matters impacting the parties in the
64
proceedings. However, the most important judicial functions of the Presidency
vis-à-vis the judicial divisions lie in the institutional arrangements that have to
be fixed before a chamber starts hearing a case. The Presidency assigns judges
65
to divisions and decides on the composition of chambers as well as the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at art. 38(1).
Id. at arts. 34(b), 36(1) & 39.
Id. at art. 39(3)(a).
Id. at art. 39(2), (3) & (4).
See Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at r. 21(3).
Id. at r. 4 bis; see Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 36(3) & 39(1).
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assignment of situations and cases to chambers. The Presidency can also decide
to temporarily attach a judge of the Trial Division to the Pre-Trial Division and
66
vice versa if the workload of the Court so requires. Similarly, it can
67
temporarily attach a judge to the Appeals Chamber if appropriate. Finally, the
Presidency decides when to call newly elected judges to full-time service if at
68
the time of the judges’ election there is insufficient workload to call them then.
With regard to the criteria for selecting judges for the judicial divisions,
article 39(1) of the Rome Statute provides some guidance:
The assignment of judges to divisions shall be based on the nature of the functions to
be performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges
elected to the Court, in such a way that each division shall contain an appropriate
combination of expertise in criminal law and procedure and in international law.

This sentence suggests that each of the three judicial divisions may need a
different proportion of criminal and international lawyers. The distinction
between these two areas of law stems from article 36(3)(b), which defines two
general determinative competence areas for judges. Further, article 39(1)
provides that the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall be composed
predominantly of judges with criminal-trial experience. This reflects the great
need for judges with hands-on procedural experience in (domestic) criminal-law
cases in the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions. Both the importance and possible
effects of the judges’ assignment to divisions should not be underestimated. It is
69
of crucial importance that the pretrial judge in particular, and later the
70
presiding—or single —judge, on the case be firmly versed in the general
principles applicable to criminal proceedings, as well as the specific legal and
procedural framework of the Court.
Up until 2011, rule 4 of the RPE provided that the decision on the
assignment of the newly sworn-in judges to the divisions was to be taken by the
71
judges in plenary session. However, in an effort to enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Court (and in this case the judiciary in particular), the ASP
amended rule 4 and added a new rule 4 bis, which stipulates in relevant part
that “[a]s soon as possible following its establishment, the Presidency shall, after
consultation with the judges, decide on the assignment of judges to divisions in
72
accordance with article 39, paragraph 1.” This amendment increased the
Presidency’s competencies and also placed a fair amount of responsibility on its

66. Id. at art. 39(4).
67. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 12.
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 35(3).
69. Article 39(2)(b)(iii) of the Rome Statute provides for the possibility that a single judge will
rule on a number of routine and procedural matters. Id. at art. 39(2)(b)(iii); see also Int’l Criminal
Court, RPE, supra note 8, at r. 7.
70. See Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at r. 132 bis. Rule 132 bis was added to the RPE
by amendment. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE Amendment, supra note 8.
71. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8.
72. Int’l Criminal Court, Amendments to Rule 4, supra note 49 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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shoulders to find administratively and strategically sound arrangements, while
being mindful of the statutory selection criteria detailed in particular in article
36.
Other assignment decisions of the Presidency follow no explicit criteria, be
they on the composition of Chambers or on the assignment of situations and
cases to Chambers. As a prerequisite to the temporary re-assignment of judges
between Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions, article 39(4) of the Statute states that in
the Presidency’s view the temporary reassignment must be required by “the
73
efficient management of the Court’s workload.” States thus left the matter to
the discretion of the Presidency with the sole postulate that it exercise its
discretion efficiently. Further, the judges decided in regulation 12 that a
temporary attachment to the Appeals Chamber must be “in the interests of the
74
administration of justice.” The slight difference in the legitimizing criteria may
be founded in the consideration that although the temporary assignment of a
judge pursuant to regulation 12 may indeed—as with article 39(4)—be a mere
efficiency measure, the temporary attachment of a judge to the Appeals
Chamber to replace another colleague in case of an interlocutory appeal may
have the consequence of blocking that judge for a later deployment into that
75
case on the pretrial or trial level.
Fortunately, in their exercise of management oversight pursuant to article
112(2)(b) of the Statute, States Parties have given the Presidency the
appropriate managerial autonomy and have, also on a more general level, not
sought to micromanage the Court. The Presidency’s leeway has been solidified
with managerial practice that has been carefully fine-tuned over the years. With
regard to the general communication between the Presidency and the other
fifteen judges of the Chambers, periodic formal and informal meetings of all
judges have been instituted. This fosters a dynamic exchange between the
different divisions, as well as between the judges and the Presidency. With the
rising caseload in all divisions and the many administrative issues with judicial
components, the necessity of regular informal information exchanges between
all judges has become ever more pressing. These meetings provide a more
general and flexible informal discussion platform than the plenary sessions of all
76
judges that are provided in the Court’s regulatory framework. Furthermore, as
regards the Presidency’s competence regarding the assignment of judges to

73. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 39(4). The provision clarifies, however, that “under no
circumstances shall a judge who has participated in the pre-trial phase of a case be eligible to sit on the
Trial Chamber hearing that case.” Id. Similarly, regulation 12 of the Regulations of the Court provides
for the temporary assignment of a judge to the Appeals Chamber “in the interests of the administration
of justice.” Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 12.
74. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 12. Article 52 of the
Rome Statute, supra note 1, stipulates that the judges adopt, by absolute majority, the Regulations of
the Court. See also Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 1.
75. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 12.
76. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 41(2); Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at
rs. 4, 12, 29 & 100.
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divisions, chambers, and cases, the absence of formally predefined criteria and
guidelines has left the past and present Presidencies with the task of
establishing a sound and adequate practice, tailored to the specific
circumstances at hand. In particular, when it comes to the assignment of judges
to divisions, it is up to the Presidency to carefully tailor an arrangement by
which as few judges as possible risk being conflicted in a given case as well as
foreseeable future cases due to prior involvement at a different stage. Likewise,
the constitution of a chamber has to be made while mindful of the length of the
respective judges’ remaining terms, amongst other factors. In its managerial
practice, the Presidency has identified a large array of different criteria for each
and every one of its constitutive tasks; these criteria must be carefully applied to
the case at hand, keeping in mind the case’s specific ramifications. It could
certainly add to procedural transparency and administrative certainty if the
catalogues of criteria applied were codified as general guidelines. However, any
such guidelines would have to remain at a high level of generality in order to
leave space for case-specific considerations and flexible solutions. In any
initiative to add more predictability and regulatory framework to the
Presidency’s operations, the decision-makers would be well-advised not to issue
an all-too-rigid set of guidelines that could stand in the way of sound and
effective case-oriented practice.
(3) The relationship between the President and Presidency and the
Registry. Article 43 of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Registry “shall be
responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of
77
the Court, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the Prosecutor.”
The nonjudicial aspects of administration encompass not only the bulk of all incourt support functions for the other organs of the Court, but also the
78
establishment of a Victims and Witnesses Unit, external communication on
relevant items, and general administration including human resources,
79
information technology, procurement, and security, among many other duties.
Pursuant to rule 14 of the ICC RPE, the Registrar has put in place regulations
80
to govern the operations of the Registry. Further, all administrative services
for the judiciary are centralized in the Registry.
One of the major improvements of the ICC over the ICTY and ICTR was
the clear delineation of the relationship between the organs, and more
specifically of the relationship between the Presidency and the Registrar. In the
regulatory framework of the UN ad hoc Tribunals, the Registrar is appointed
81
by the Secretary-General, while the Prosecutor is appointed by the Security
77. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 43(1).
78. Id. at art. 43(6); Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at rs. 17 & 18.
79. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at rs. 13, 15, 20, 21 & 22 (regarding the Registrar’s
responsibilities relating to the rights of the defense); see also Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the
Court, supra note 9, at regulations 40, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85 & 90.
80. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Registry, supra note 14.
81. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 16(3); ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 17(3).
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Council, and the judges are elected by the General Assembly. Although the
appointment of the Registrar has to follow the Secretary-General’s
“consultation with the President of the International Tribunal,” the final
84
prerogative rests with the Secretary-General. All three organs of the ad hoc
85
Tribunals thus have in common that their principals are elected or appointed
by an external authority. Further, although the Tribunals’ statutes prescribe
that the Registry is “responsible for the administration and servicing of the
86
International Tribunal,” nowhere do they establish an explicit hierarchy
between the organs. Instead, the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
adopted by the judges themselves, merely dictate that the President supervises
the activities of the Registry and that the Registrar acts “[u]nder the authority
87
of the President.” This suggests not only a certain lack of clarity as regards the
(in)dependence of the Registrar from the President, but also that the Registrar
may in fact be accountable to an outside actor, and not to any organ inside the
88
institution. An audit of the administrative and institutional arrangements of
the ICTR in 1997 (known as the Paschke Report) discovered “mismanagement
in almost all areas of the Tribunal and frequent violations of United Nations
89
rules and regulations.” It further noted the following with regard to one
perceived reason for the mismanagement:
The Registrar acknowledged that both the Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor
have raised questions with him concerning decisions he has taken which impact on
their functions. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide the President of the
Tribunal with authority over the Registrar and provide the Prosecutor with
independence of decisions. However, the Registrar argued that the Rules were
subsidiary to the statute and therefore could not subject the Registrar to the
supervision of another organ of the Tribunal. The Registrar has declined to meet
administrative requests from the judges or the Office of the Prosecutor where in his
judgement they were insufficiently justified. The disputes over the authority of the

82. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 15(4); ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 16(4).
83. Both permanent and ad litem judges are elected from a list submitted by the UN Security
Council. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at arts. 12 bis, 12 ter; ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at arts. 13 bis,
13 ter.
84. ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 17(3).
85. Pursuant to art. 11 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 25 (and art. 10 of the ICTR Statute, supra
note 25), the Tribunals consist of the Chambers, the Prosecutor and the Registry.
86. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 16(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 17(1); see also
ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10(c); ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 11(c).
87. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2d Sess., Jan. 17–Feb. 11, 1994, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, rs. 19(A) & 33(A), ICTY Doc. IT/32/Rev. 49 (May 22, 2013) [hereinafter Int’l
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, RPE] (first adopted on Feb. 11, 1994), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev49_en.pdf;
Int’l
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 19(A) (Apr. 10, 2013) (first
adopted on June 29, 1995), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Evidance/
English/130410amended%206_26.pdf.
88. See David Tolbert, Article 43: The Registry, in COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 981, 986, ¶ 9.
89. Karl Th. Paschke, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, Rep. of the Office
of Internal Oversight Services on the Audit and Investigation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (Feb. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Paschke, Paschke Report].
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Registrar need to be addressed. As currently perceived by him, he can - and does overrule decisions on substantive administrative matters taken by the judges and the
Office of the Prosecutor. According to the Registrar, he has absolute authority when it
comes to any matter with administrative or financial implications. Because of this
perception, almost no decision can be taken by the other
organs of the Tribunal that
90
does not receive his review and agreement or rejection.

In response to the Paschke Report, the Secretary-General proceeded to replace
the Registrar. Presumably, the Secretary-General was also guided by the
general submission that the Registrar indeed “service[s] both the Chambers and
91
the Prosecutor” and cannot be an entity operating independently from the
92
others. However, the lack of institutional clarity concerning the Registrar’s
role in the ad hoc Tribunals’ statutes remains a fact.
Aware of this statutory weakness and of the resulting threat of
inefficiencies, the drafters of the Rome Statute supplied statutory provisions
entrusting the Presidency with the responsibility for the proper administration
of the Court. Even more explicitly, they stipulated the President’s authority
93
over the Registrar. Further underlining the Registrar’s subordination, the
Rome Statute provides that the Registrar be elected (and can be removed from
94
office) by the judges. The lesson learned from the UN ad hoc Tribunals was
that if the administration is to serve the mission of the Court as a whole, it
needs to be accountable to the ultimate authorities in the courtroom, namely
the judges.
Despite the institutional guidance of the statutory framework, the powers
and competencies of the Registrar vis-à-vis the President and Prosecutor were
the subject of discussions in the first years of the Court’s existence. There was a
perceived lack of clarity in the delineation of competencies between the organs
of the Court resulting in some resistance in implementing the statutory
framework in practice. However, in 2010, the Court issued a report describing
the relevant aspects of its corporate governance framework in an effort to
95
increase clarity with respect to the responsibilities of the Court’s organs. The
so-called Governance Report addresses what the heads of organs had previously
identified as the major potential risks the Court should avoid or contain: (1)
lack of effectiveness or quality of the Court’s operations, (2) divisions inside the
96
Court, and (3) the loss of external support for the Court. It outlines the most

90. Id. ¶ 8.
91. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10(c); ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 11(c).
92. See Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at r. 19(A) (of both ad hoc Tribunals).
93. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 38(3)(a) & 43(2).
94. Id. at art. 43(4) (for the election); id. at art. 46(3) (for the removal). The Registrar can be
removed for reasons of “serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties under this Statute,
as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” Id. at art. 46(1)(a).
95. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 9th Sess., Dec. 6–10, 2010, Report of the Court
on Measures to Increase Clarity on the Responsibilities of the Different Organs, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/9/34
(Dec. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Governance Report], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/ICC-ASP-9-34-ENG.pdf.
96. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15.
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significant measures taken to date and others remaining to be taken in order to
assess and manage these risks. These measures include, among others, (1) a
series of court-wide administrative issuances establishing a “common, unified
97
system for the setting of Court rules, policies and procedures,” (2) the Court’s
Coordination Council, (3) the Court’s strategic planning in operational core
98
99
areas, (4) a number of interorgan coordination groups and mechanisms, and
100
(5) the Court’s Audit Committee.
Most importantly, however, the Governance Report delineates the roles and
responsibilities of the Presidency and the Registry for all areas of the Registry’s
activities with interorgan relevance, adding clarity to the distinction between
101
the Court’s administrative and judicial functions. Further, in order to achieve
effective strategic supervision of the Registry, appropriate management as well
as reporting mechanisms and tools are necessary to ensure that the Presidency
has adequate assurance and control. To this end, the Court adopted its
corporate governance statement on February 25, 2010, clarifying the roles and
102
responsibilities of the different organs at a general level. Furthermore, a
comprehensive, integrated management-control system covering all areas of the
Registry is currently being developed.
In essence, the Governance Report demonstrates that the Court has been
able to devise a proper structure and equilibrium between the organs by
assessing the major risks to the institution, identifying measures to reduce or
control these risks, and putting these measures in place. Specifically regarding
the relationship between the Presidency and Registry, effective strategic
supervision of the Registry will be greatly facilitated once the managementcontrol system becomes fully operational.
However, managerial practice remains the most relevant means to facilitate
communication and coordination between the President and the Registrar.
Periodic meetings between the President and the Registrar continue to be the
most direct and effective forum to discuss all administrative matters of strategic
concern for the President or Presidency. In addition, staff of the respective
immediate offices liaises frequently in order to facilitate a swift and flexible
103
information exchange. The steady increase in activities over the past five years
has made efficient communication between the President and the Registrar all

97. Id. ¶ 16.
98. Id.
99. For a comprehensive overview of standing interorgan working groups, see id. ¶ 25.
100. See Int’l Criminal Court, President, ICC. Doc. ICC/PRESD/G/2008/001 (Aug. 4, 2008),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/vademecum/PD/
Audit%20Committee%20(2008).PDF.
101. Int’l Criminal Court, Governance Report, supra note 95, ¶¶ 27–30.
102. Id. at annex I.
103. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 10th Sess., Dec. 12–21, 2011, Report of the
Court on the Implementation and Operation of the Governance Arrangements, ¶ 11, ICC Doc. ICCASP/10/7 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-7ENG.pdf.
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the more essential. In particular, informal communication on the operational
level has proven to be indispensable to disposing of the multitude of items
arising on a daily level that require mutual information and coordination.
Current practice is based on a common understanding between both organs as
to which issues fall within the remit of consultation and coordination and which
issues are part of routine administration and thus do not merit express
discussion between the President and the Registrar. It remains a challenge to
maintain this common understanding in light of the often rapid pace of events,
multiple assignments for all involved, and occasional personnel changes. In
particular, for comparatively small structures such as the Presidency and the
Registrar’s Immediate Office (which have no more than a handful of persons on
each side dealing with all matters of managerial relevance on a strategic level),
it is crucial that managerial practice is backed up by a high degree of flexibility
and professionalism, as well as the capacity to quickly produce common
solutions to often unconventional and unexpected problems.
Managerial practice has produced a number of operations-level interorgan
working groups in order to address recurrent administrative issues. These
groups facilitate effective coordination and cooperation not only between the
Presidency and Registry, but also with the OTP. The Court’s Budget Working
Group, External Relations Working Group, and Tripartite Committee (the
main body at the operational management level dealing with managerial issues
of interorgan concern) are just some illustrative examples of such interorgan
groups. These interorgan coordination bodies necessarily represent the practical
translation of the constitutional requirements of the Court’s legal and
constitutive framework. In other words, managerial practice has created the
operational arrangements to fulfill the institutional postulates.
(4) The relationship between the Presidency and the Prosecutor.
Although both the President and the Prosecutor are independent from each
other—and this independence is a crucial instance of the segregation of the
104
Court’s powers into distinct pillars of Court judicial credibility —it is obvious
that the President and Prosecutor must collaborate in the course of discharging
their duties. The Presidency is responsible for the proper administration of the
105
Court while the Prosecutor has authority over the management of the staff
106
and other resources of his or her office. Hence coherence in the approach to
individual matters such as conditions of service, administrative practices and
policies, and other strategic items is necessary to ensure that the Court does not
act inconsistently from organ to organ. Article 38(4) of the Rome Statute sets a
clear obligation for the Presidency (and, mutatis mutandis, a corresponding
obligation for the Prosecutor) to seek the Prosecutor’s concurrence on matters
related to the administration of the Court. This principle of concurrence rather
104. Int’l Criminal Court, Governance Report, supra note 95, ¶ 10.
105. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 43(2).
106. Id. at art. 42(2).
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than a principle of hierarchy underpins the fact that both the President and the
Prosecutor operate on “eye level,” while the Registry is ultimately subordinate
107
to the President.
Just as managerial practice has facilitated the relationship between the
President and the Registrar, it has also led to a sound and pragmatic
communication practice more generally. Although bilateral meetings between
the President and the Prosecutor occur on an ad hoc basis, the communication
on the senior-management and operational levels is constant and effective. For
one, the aforementioned interorgan working groups cover a large array of
topics that require coordination. Separately, frequent informal consultations
have led to an efficient communication network for essential items. Finally,
communication of all three heads of organs in the Court’s Coordination
108
Council serves as one of the most powerful means to comply with the
requirements of article 38(4) of the Statute with practice arrangements on
109
different levels.
(5) The Coordination Council of the Court. In practice, it is obvious
110
that all three organs need to closely cooperate to ensure smooth nonjudicial
administration. The Court has therefore established the Coordination Council,
as defined in regulation 3 of the Regulations of the Court:
1. There shall be a Coordination Council comprised of the President on behalf of the
Presidency, the Prosecutor and the Registrar.
2. The Coordination Council shall meet at least once a month and on any other
occasion at the request of one of its members in order to discuss and coordinate
on,
111
where necessary, the administrative activities of the organs of the Court.

The Coordination Council is not intended to be a decision-making body, but
rather serves as the coordination platform on all managerial and strategic issues
112
of interorgan concern within the Court. Agreements between all three organs,
which is the desired outcome of discussions on all matters of common concern,
are made in the Coordination Council. In practice, such agreements have a
binding effect, and any intention of any of the organs to deviate from such
113
agreements would need to be brought again before the Coordination Council.
The institution of the Coordination Council has proven extremely useful and in
almost all matters a common understanding can be reached between the organs.

107. Int’l Criminal Court, Governance Report, supra note 95, ¶ 11; see also Tolbert, supra note 88,
at 986, ¶ 9.
108. See infra Part III.A.1.a.v.
109. Regulation 3 of the Regulations, supra note 9, arguably does not encompass all matters that
fall within the ambit of “matters of mutual concern” of the Presidency and the OTP regarding the
proper administration of the Court. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 38(4).
110. The Presidency represents the judicial divisions internally in all nonjudicial administrative
matters. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 3(1); Deschênes &
Staker, supra note 51, at 953, ¶ 6.
111. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, supra note 9, at regulation 3.
112. Int’l Criminal Court, Governance Report, supra note 95, ¶ 21.
113. Id.
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Further, in the few instances where a unanimous position cannot be reached
between the organs, the Coordination Council is vested with an escalation
114
mechanism. It has therefore ensured that the Court’s principals have a
common approach to administrative issues, possibly in response to the frequent
115
demands of external stakeholders.
The Coordination Council has repeatedly proven to be the appropriate
forum for discussing and agreeing upon the major strategic items in the Court’s
governance framework. In the context of the various governance and internal
control mechanisms of the Court, the Coordination Council is the most
significant body charting the Court’s course. It is supported on the operational
level by the Tripartite Committee. The Tripartite Committee carries out all
managerial tasks that are either delegated by the Coordination Council or that
must be completed before Coordination Council discussion.
Because the Coordination Council consists of only the heads of organs and
some of their senior managers, managerial practice over the past years has
reinforced the Coordination Council’s strategic importance as a forum for the
heads of organs to have an informed discussion on all issues that go to the very
heart of the institution’s operations. It has also secured the council’s role as the
forum in which to resolve interorgan disagreements with final determinations.
This practice, backed up by the Court’s governance framework, has provided
the ICC with a dynamic and meaningful communication and coordination
structure at the highest strategic level.
b. The role and independence of the Prosecutor. The Rome Statute
contains a built-in structural bipolarity, with the Prosecutor and the judiciary
(comprising the Presidency and Chambers) on equal—and independent—
footing. Article 42(1) of the Statute provides that the OTP shall act
independently as a separate organ of the Court. This institutional arrangement
is identical in the UN ad hoc Tribunals and other international(ized) criminal
116
courts such as the SCSL, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and
(though the similarity of the arrangement is less explicit in the relevant statute)
117
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).

114. Although every effort is made to achieve unanimity of all participants in the Coordination
Council, agreements reached between the President and the Prosecutor are binding on the Registrar by
virtue of the President’s authority over the Registrar. Id.
115. The principle of all organs of the Court to seek concurrence on the central issues of common
administrative concern is part of the Court’s governance framework and part of what is generally
referred to as the “One-Court-Principle.” See the Court’s Previous Strategic Plan, supra note 5, ¶¶ 14–
16.
116. STL Statute, supra note 40, at art. 11(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 15(2); ICTY
Statute, supra note 25, at art. 16(2); SCSL Statute, supra note 39, at art. 15(1) (second sentence); see
also Bergsmo & Harhoff, supra note 31, at 972, ¶ 4.
117. Article 6 of the ECCC Statute, supra note 42, provides that “[t]he co-prosecutors shall be
independent in the performance of their functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from any
Government or any other source,” but does not explicitly state that the Prosecutor’s office operates as a
separate organ of the ECCC. This, however, is made explicit on the ECCC’s homepage: “The Office of
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The OTP’s statutory core function is to trigger the Court’s judicial
118
activities. This is a significant function, because the Court’s activities begin
well before trial. As a general matter, before any case against an individual can
be brought before the chamber, the Court must first establish its jurisdiction in
119
a situation brought before it—following the parameters as outlined above.
The exact investigative sequence will vary slightly depending on whether a
situation is referred to the Court or the Court begins investigation of its own
120
accord. When a potential situation is referred by a State Party or the Security
Council, the Prosecutor independently analyzes the information received by
121
During this phase the Prosecutor
way of a preliminary examination.
122
determines whether or not there is a basis to begin an investigation. If the
Prosecutor then decides that there is a reasonable basis to commence an
123
investigation, she will initiate the investigative activities of her office.
However, if the Prosecutor decides to launch a proprio motu investigation
following her preliminary examination into a situation, the Rome Statute
imposes an additional requirement before the Prosecutor may begin.
Authorization must be sought from a Pre-Trial Chamber of three judges, which
will assess the Court’s jurisdiction and the Prosecutor’s conclusion that there is
124
a reasonable basis to begin an investigation. This provision is of particular
importance because it adds an institutional hurdle for the Prosecutor to justify
her case, and thus provides an extra safeguard against politically motivated
125
investigations and prosecutions. Further, although the OTP carries out its
investigations independently, during the investigation phase the Pre-Trial
Chamber may exercise a number of critical functions including authorizing
126
special investigative steps or taking measures to protect evidence.
As regards the OTP’s administrative structure, a certain difference from the
UN ad hoc Tribunals’ arrangements catches the eye: The ICC OTP unites in its
general Services Section (SS) a number of fundamental administrative support
the Co-Prosecutors (OCP) is an independent office within the ECCC.” Office of the Co-Prosecutors,
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/
organs/topic/4 (last visited July 22, 2013).
118. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 13, 14 & 15.
119. See supra Part III.A.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 13.
121. Situations may come before the Court by way of one of the three so-called trigger mechanisms
for the Court’s jurisdiction: (1) a State Party may refer a situation to the Prosecutor, (2) the Security
Council may refer a situation to the Prosecutor, or (3) the Prosecutor may begin an investigation
proprio motu, on her own initiative. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 13 & 15.
122. In order to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation,
article 53(1)(a)–(c) of the Rome Statute, supra note 1, provides that the Prosecutor shall consider
jurisdiction, admissibility (complementarity), gravity, and whether an investigation would serve the
interests of justice.
123. Id. at art. 18(1).
124. Id. at art. 15(3), (4); Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at r. 50.
125. Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejić, Article 15: Prosecutor, in COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at
591, art. 15 ¶ 27.
126. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 56 & 57(3).
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services such as the Information and Evidence Unit, the Knowledge Base Unit,
and language services, as well as the General Administration Unit, which deals,
inter alia, with the preparation of the OTP budget. The SS operates
independently from similar support sections of the Registry, serving the
proceedings in general, and the judiciary in particular. This separation and
parallel system of partially identical services is based to a large extent on
negative experiences from the UN ad hoc Tribunals. According to the Paschke
Report (which was, recall, a 1997 audit of the ICTR’s then-existing
administrative and institutional arrangements), the majority of the
administrative support for the Prosecutor’s activities was provided by the
127
Registry. Staff carrying out important assignments for the Prosecutor’s office
did not report to the Prosecutor but to the Registrar, thus depriving the former
128
129
of its administrative—and possibly institutional —independence.
In its
conclusion, the Paschke Report found it imperative that the ICTR “maintain
the separate, specifically assigned authority and responsibilities unique to each
130
organ, particularly as between the Registry and the Office of the Prosecutor.”
Further, it recommended that the ICTR “should set forth clearly the role, scope
and reporting relationships of the Registrar, within the definitions established
by the statute, so that the independence of the Chambers and the Office of the
Prosecutor are fully recognized and the service function of the Registry is
131
emphasized and guided.” Lastly, the report recommended that the ICTR’s
Victims and Witnesses Unit, previously located in the Registry, be located
132
within the OTP.
The Paschke Report illustrates that although cooperation and resource
sharing can be efficient, independence is necessary. Article 42(2) of the Statute
stipulates that the Prosecutor shall have “full authority over the management
and administration of the Office, including the staff, facilities and other
133
resources thereof.” This provision serves as the legal basis for the Prosecutor’s
134
“own” independent administrative support services. The provision stands in
tension with the ICC’s strategic goal of having an efficient and effective
135
To find the right balance is very
administrative support structure.

127. Paschke, Paschke Report, supra note 89, ¶¶ 56–59.
128. The Paschke Report, supra note 89, makes the following finding regarding the situation in the
ICTR Office of the Prosecutor in 1997: “In OIOS discussions with the Deputy Prosecutor, when
questions concerning deficiencies in the operations of the Office of the Prosecutor were raised and he
was asked what he had done to address them, he repeatedly responded that he did not have the
authority to do so. This position effectively abolished the independence of the Prosecutor’s Office and
reduced it to yet another section of the Registry.” Id. ¶ 58.
129. Thomas Patrick & Cherif Bassiouni, Organization of the International Criminal Court:
Administrative and Financial Issues, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 333, 337 (1997).
130. Paschke, Paschke Report, supra note 89, ¶ 71.
131. Id. ¶ 78.
132. Id. ¶ 99.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 42(2).
134. Tolbert, supra note 88, at 986, ¶¶ 6–7.
135. Int’l Criminal Court, Previous Strategic Plan, supra note 5, ¶¶ 41–44; Int’l Criminal Court,
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complicated, and can only be achieved through frequent policy checks and
structural revisions. A past dispute at the ad hoc Tribunals over language
services, the administrative support service responsible for interpretation and
translation, provides an illustrative example of possible points of contention. In
1998, the Secretary-General called a group of experts (expert group) to conduct
a review of the effective operation and functioning of the UN ad hoc
136
137
Tribunals. On November 11, 1999, the expert group submitted its report,
acknowledging that the Prosecutor’s dependence on the Registry’s language
services had led to friction and a struggle for resources. It therefore
recommended that the Prosecutor’s offices in both ad hoc Tribunals receive
138
administrative responsibility for their own language staff.
Partly as a result of these conclusions of the expert group, the OTP’s and
Registry’s language services at the ICC have, in practice, been separated, with
the latter’s services assisting other Registry clients as well as the Judiciary.
Occasional challenges to this arrangement have not yet indicated any advantage
to reverting back to a joint language-support section for the whole ICC. Indeed,
the UN ad hoc Tribunals’ joint language-support sections were found to be
suboptimal in 1999. In order to avoid possible duplication between the two,
constructive coordination and cooperation between the sections and organs is
of the essence.
The statutory independence of the Prosecutor further provides that she has
full managerial autonomy over the administration and management of staff and
nonstaff resources like recruitment, funds for travel, equipment, security of
139
information and evidence, and so forth. Against this, article 43(1) of the
Rome Statute determines that the Registry shall be responsible for the “nonjudicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court, without
prejudice to the functions and powers of the Prosecutor in accordance with article
140
42.” This leads to dual responsibility for these resources, a feature that, to this
141
date, is reflected only cursorily in the Court’s legal framework: In the FRR,
regulation 1.4 provides that
[t]hese Regulations shall be implemented in a manner consistent with
responsibilities of the Prosecutor and of the Registrar as set out in articles
paragraph 2, and 43, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor and
Registrar shall cooperate, taking into account the independent exercise by
Prosecutor of his or her functions under the Statute.

the
42,
the
the

Strategic Plan 2013–2017, supra note 5, at 6–7 (Goal 2: Managerial).
136. G.A. Res. 53/213, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/213 (Dec. 18, 1998); G.A. Res. 53/212, ¶ 6, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/53/212 (Dec. 18, 1998).
137. Rep. of the Expert Grp. to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of
the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Int’l Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc.
A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Expert Group].
138. Id. ¶¶ 251–252 (documenting that the expert group also recommended that the OTP receive
administrative responsibility over its own public information and witness protection staff).
139. Bergsmo & Harhoff, supra note 31, at 974–75, ¶ 11.
140. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 43(1) (emphasis added).
141. Int’l Criminal Court, FRR, supra note 11.
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The FRR, however, leave undefined the manner by which the Prosecutor’s
independence shall be implemented. Financial rule 101.1(b) sets out the
Registrar’s responsibility to ensure compliance with the FRR. Addressing the
administrative functions falling under the authority of the OTP, it references
“appropriate institutional arrangements” to be made between the Prosecutor
and the Registrar. However, to date no such arrangements have been
published, and the Registrar only mentioned them in the financial statements
142
for the year 2011; in none of the previous statements had this been the case. It
is hoped that the institutional arrangements mentioned in the 2011 financial
statements adequately and sustainably regulate an area where a lack of proper
arrangements may lead to conflicts, resulting eventually in inefficiencies in the
143
Court’s operations—a task that pertains to both organs. Further, the 2011
financial statements do not specify where and in what manner the Registrar can
actually ensure the required compliance. The lack of notification of such
arrangements could constitute a weakness in the controls safeguarding the
financial management of the Court. Ultimately, this may be an issue for the
144
Court’s financial auditor to assess.
On a general level, practical arrangements between all organs have struck a
balance between the independence of the OTP and the Court’s need to react to
outside pressures and challenges in a united fashion. All Court-internal
interorgan bodies and groups that affect the rights and interests of the OTP
contain an OTP staff member. Those consultative and management bodies that
operate on a strategic level—such as the Coordination Council, the Tripartite
Committee, and the Budget Working Group—are comprised of members from
each of the organs and follow the statutory postulate of judicial and
145
prosecutorial independence, as well as the Registrar’s neutrality.
2. Major Features of the Administrative Structure
a. Quasi-Judicial role of the Registry. The Registry is headed by the
146
Registrar, who is supported by the Immediate Office. It is composed of two
divisions, which reflect the scope of its work. The Common Administrative
Services Division (CASD) is dedicated to the nonjudicial administration of the
ICC, including human resources, budget and finance, information technologies,
147
and general services. The Court Services Division (CSD) provides the Court
142. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Financial
Statements for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2011, at 3, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/12 (Aug. 28,
2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-12-ENG.pdf.
143. See Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 15, at
regulation 20 (institutional arrangements with the Registry).
144. See Int’l Criminal Court, FRR, supra note 11, at regulation 12.1 (“The Assembly of States
Parties shall appoint an Auditor, which may be an internationally recognized firm of auditors or an
Auditor General or an official of a State Party with an equivalent title.”)
145. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 40(1), 42(1), 43(1) & 43(2).
146. Int’l Criminal Court, Proposed Programme Budget for 2014, supra note 9, ¶¶ 277–280.
147. Id. ¶¶ 348–450.
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with judicial proceedings–management support, language support, and witness
148
protection and support. The CSD also facilitates victim participation in the
149
proceedings through its Victim Participation and Reparation Section.
As has been established above, the Registry is responsible for the
nonjudicial aspects of the administration and the servicing of the proceedings.
However, at the same time, the role of the Registry goes beyond the role of a
mere service provider to the judges and the Prosecutor. As one of the organs of
the Court, it has a quasi-judicial role in certain areas like detention, legal aid,
and, most importantly, witness protection through its Victims and Witnesses
150
Unit. This dual role has created frictions in several instances, in particular
between the Registry and the OTP regarding questions of witness protection.
Similar to the current situation at the ICTY, the task of the protection of
151
witnesses is entrusted to the Registry. However, the OTP also has a large
number of contact points with victims and potential witnesses, especially during
152
its investigations. Pursuant to article 68(1) of the Rome Statute, it is even
subject to a statutory obligation to take appropriate measures to protect the
safety of victims and witnesses during the investigation and prosecution of
statutory crimes. This has led to legal arguments between the OTP and the
Registrar before the Court’s chambers. It was ultimately the Appeals Chamber
in the case of Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo that decided on the
distribution of roles and responsibilities between the two organs, curtailing the
153
Prosecutor’s role with regard to the preventive relocation of witnesses. The
Chamber highlighted the particular need for cooperation between the organs in
154
this field.

148. Id. ¶¶ 451–580.
149. See Participation of Victims in Proceedings, INT’L CRIM. COURT (July 26, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/victims/participation/Pages/
participation%20of%20victims%20in%20proceedings.aspx.
150. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 43(6); Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at rs. 16,
17, 18 & 19.
151. At the ICTY, the Victims and Witnesses Section of the Registry supports and protects all
witnesses, whether they are called by the Prosecution, Defense, or Chambers. The section acts as an
independent and neutral body, providing logistical, psychological and protective measures. See ICTY
Statute, supra note 25, at art. 22; Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, RPE, supra note 87,
at r. 75.
152. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c), 54(1), 54(3)(f) & 68(1).
153. Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision
on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under
Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules” of Pre-Trial Chamber I, ¶¶ 98–103 (Nov. 26,
2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc602198.pdf. (Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was originally a
coaccused in this case; those proceedings have since been severed, Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Implementation of Regultion 55 of the Regulations of the
Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons (Nov. 21, 2012), and are now on appeal,
Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04/02/12, Decision on the Presiding Judge of the Appeals
Chamber in the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II Entitled
“Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut,” (Jan. 16, 2013).)
154. Id. ¶ 101.
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With the steady increase of operations in the field to as many as eight
different situations by the end of 2013, the managerial practice of coordination
between relevant sections of the OTP and the Registry has gone a long way
towards reconciling both organs’ positions and finding workable solutions in the
field. These solutions differ due to the sometimes-high variance of conditions
on the ground. Even when discussion is still ongoing at a strategic policy level
(as it has been in the past) practice has resulted in solving matters on the
ground.
b. The Common Administrative Services Division of the Registry. For
general administrative matters relevant to all organs, a separate division has
been created. It is comprised of the Human Resources Section, the Budget and
Finance Section, the IT Section, the General Services Section, and the Field
Operations Section. With this setup, the ICC follows the administrative
structure of the UN ad hoc Tribunals almost identically. The ad hoc Tribunals
themselves follow the structure of the UN, its agencies, and its peacekeeping
missions.
In other words, instead of revising this structure with regard to its efficiency
and appropriateness for a treaty-based Court of a permanent nature, the ICC
copied an existing model. This is somewhat surprising given that the UN itself
had doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of the ad hoc Tribunals’
155
structure, and that practitioners argued for a different structure that ensured
the necessary flexibility for the ICC in terms of its administration and
156
financing. However, although the expert group had already stated in 1999 that
the hybrid construction of the ad hoc Tribunals would create frictions, in
157
particular between the Registry and the OTP, a model of central services for
all organs of the Court was created. This was clearly done in the spirit of
158
avoiding duplication of services and saving costs.
The initial plan was to somehow separate the CASD (which, at the time,
was called the “Common Services Division”) from the rest of the Registry in
order to underpin its character as a court-wide and neutral service provider.
The President and the Prosecutor would cooperate in the management of that
159
division, especially during times when the Registrar was not yet elected. The
neutral approach of the CASD was further underpinned by an attempt to create
different budgets for the organs, administered by the division. The official

155. See G.A. Res. 53/213, supra note 136; G.A. Res. 53/212, supra note 136; see also Report of the
Expert Group, supra note 137.
156. Hans Holthuis, Registrar, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Address to the
Plenary of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court During Its Seventh Session
(Mar. 6, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8011).
157. Report of the Expert Group, supra note 137, ¶ 22.
158. Tolbert, supra note 88, at 983, ¶ 3.
159. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records,
pt. III, ¶ 97, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/ADB79E04-77FF-40E9-B8F6-E030AFE77110/140185/asp_official_recs_1_2_res_en.pdf.
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records of the first ASP read as follows: “It is envisaged that the CASD would
be granted a sub-budget by both the Registrar (on behalf of the Presidency) and
the Prosecutor (for the Office of the Prosecutor) to provide the administrative
160
support which each of them requires and would have budgeted for.”
However, despite this clear separation, the CASD became a full part of the
Registry without organ-specific subbudgets. All staff resources, as well as
nonstaff resources like furniture, IT equipment, general utilities, and others,
were budgeted within the budget of the Registry (as set forth in Major
161
Programme III). None of the subordinate budgets specified the organ-specific
amounts in those areas. This amalgamation of the CASD into the Registry has
cast some doubt on whether it could service the OTP as neutrally as would be
necessary and appropriate while at the same time being true to its own
162
mandates, which may overlap with the operations of the OTP.
The practical solution to this problem has been the establishment of the
aforementioned General Services Section of the OTP, which carries out a
number of OTP-support tasks independently from the Registry. For those
administrative functions that the CASD continues to cover for the OTP,
managerial practice has again filled the gap. Ad hoc bilateral arrangements
between both organs have created precedents over time on how to tackle
certain issues that occur periodically or else have solidified a practice. Further,
interorgan bodies on a managerial level such as the Tripartite Committee or the
Budget Working Group have served to calibrate the organs’ roles and functions
on all routine administrative matters of interorgan concern—and provide a
forum for discussion of all novel and unforeseen items.
c. The financial management of the Court. The annual budget of the ICC
is drafted by the different organs and sections of the Court under the
163
coordination of the Registrar, and is approved by the ASP. Prior to its
submission to the Assembly, it is submitted to the Committee on Budget and
164
Finance (CBF) for budgetary and financial review.

160. Id.
161. Int’l Criminal Court, Proposed Programme Budget for 2014, supra note 9, ¶¶ 348–450. The
subdivision of the Court’s budget into Major Programmes has been followed since the adoption of its
second yearly budget. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 2nd Sess., Sept. 8–12, 2003,
Official Records, pt. I.A, ¶¶ 48–51, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/2/10, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/524487BC-0DC1-4FBD-B4CA-44D06C4E796A/140196/ICCASP2_EN.pdf.
162. Again, the field of witness protection can be highlighted. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on Evidentiary
Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the
Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules” of Pre-Trial Chamber I, ¶¶ 98–103 (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc602198.pdf.
163. Int’l Criminal Court, FRR, supra note 11, at regulation 3.1 & r. 103.2(1).
164. Id. at r. 103.2(2).
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(1) The Committee on Budget and Finance. The CBF was established
by the Assembly during its first plenary meeting on September 3, 2002 as a
165
subsidiary body to the ASP. Its mandate as set forth in article 112(2)(b), (d),
and subparagraph (4) of the Rome Statute encompasses the technical
examination of any document submitted to the Assembly that carries financial
or budgetary implications or contains any other matter of a financial, budgetary,
or administrative consequence. In particular, this includes the consideration of
the Court’s proposed budget, which the Court usually submits to the CBF in
166
July of the preceding year. The CBF is composed of twelve members who are
international experts of recognized standing and experience in financial
167
matters. Shortly prior to each Assembly meeting, the CBF meets with the
Court and seeks further clarifications on the proposed budget and additions
when appropriate. At the end of the session a CBF report is submitted to the
Assembly with a recommendation concerning the final appropriation of the
Court’s proposed budget.
(2) The Court’s budget development over the years. The Court’s
budget has developed dynamically. In the fiscal year 2009 the overall budget
crossed the mark of €100 million per annum. As is typical for international
organizations, staff costs form the major part of the budget. Contrary to many
other organizations, until 2012 the Court did not have to pay for its
accommodations because the host state the Netherlands had offered to house
the Court during its first ten years free of cost. However, this period came to an
end in 2012 and it was unclear for some time that year whether the host state
would continue to cover the rent for the Court until the Court’s permanent
premises are ready to be occupied. After some negotiations, the host state
finally declared it would cover fifty percent of the yearly rent up to a ceiling of
168
€3 million until the Court moves into its new permanent premises in 2015.
During its first years, the Court produced significant financial surpluses due
to its inability to implement the approved budget in full. This was mainly the
result of overly optimistic planning; the first budget for the ICC (for the period
from October 2002 until December 2003) estimated €30.8 million in
expenditures. This estimate assumed an eventual approved staffing table of 202
posts (excluding elected officials) with a “core staffing” of 49 posts to be
165. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Establishment of the Committee on Budget
and Finance, Res. 4, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/Res.4 (Sept. 3, 2002), available at http://untreaty.un.org/
cod/icc/asp/1stsession/report/english/part_iv_res_4_e.pdf.
166. Id. ¶ 3. The CBF also considers reports of the Auditor concerning the financial operations of
the Court and transmits them to the Assembly. Int’l Criminal Court, FRR, supra note 11, at regulation
12.9.
167. Id.
168. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Programme Budget for 2013, the Working
Capital Fund for 2013, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of the International
Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for 2013 and the Contingency Fund, pt. C, ICC Doc. ICCASP/11/Res.1 (Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Programme Budget for 2013], available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-Res1-ENG.pdf.
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169

recruited in 2002 alone. Given that by the end of the regular session no judges
and no Prosecutor had been elected, and that resumption of the session would
not take place before February 2003, it was already obvious that the Court
would by no means be able to implement its budget in the absence of
substantive judicial or prosecutorial activity. Further, it would be impossible to
recruit so many staff in such a short period of time. However, during both
resumptions this surplus of resources seemingly remained unnoticed and no one
asked for a realistic reduction of these amounts. Consequently, the first
financial period of the Court ended with a cash surplus of €10.4 million, or onethird of the total approved budget for that period.
The second budget, approved by the ASP in September 2003, continued this
optimistic approach. The Court was granted a budget of €53.07 million and an
approved staffing of 375 posts for the fiscal year 2004. This budget was also not
implemented in full, although the surplus was less significant than in the first
financial period. Again, the main reason for the underimplementation was the
fact that it was not possible to recruit as many people as posts that had been
established, in particular in the OTP, because the Prosecutor had only taken
office in June 2003. Before that date, recruitments in the OTP were not
possible, because by virtue of article 42 of the Rome Statute it is only the
Prosecutor who is able to appoint staff to his or her office.
Apart from overly optimistic planning, the main reason for the initially low
implementation of the budget was the fact that the Prosecutor did not open
investigations before mid-2003. After the referrals of two situations (the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda) by the corresponding
governments, the Prosecutor opened investigations into the situation in the
170
171
DRC on June 23, 2004 and into the situation in Uganda on July 29, 2004.
Given that prior to this decision it would have been unwise to recruit larger
numbers of investigators, the budget implementation had necessarily been
delayed to avoid what in the worst case would have involved hiring
investigators who lacked necessary skills, namely language skills.
169. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1–12, 2002, Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, add., pt. 1, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/2/Add.1 (July 1, 2002) (Draft Budget for the First Financial Period of the Court); see
also Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 10th Sess., July 1–12, 2002, Draft Resolution of
the Assembly of States Parties Relating to Budget Appropriations for the First Financial Period and
Financing of Appropriations for the First Financial Period, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/2, annex III (July
24, 2002).
170. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens Its First Investigation, ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-20040623-59 (June 23,
2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
2004/Pages/the%20office%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%2
0court%20opens%20its%20first%20investigation.aspx.
171. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens
an Investigation into Northern Uganda, ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-20040729-65 (July 29, 2004),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%
20icc%200204/press%20releases/Pages/prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20cou
rt%20opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern%20uganda.aspx.
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The CBF reviewed the situation during its third session in August 2004. It
noted that a particular reason for the low implementation of the budget was the
fact that the Prosecutor had started investigations only recently, and therefore
172
the recruitment of investigators had been—rightly—delayed. As has been
evident in the context of the ad hoc Tribunals, the major cost driver for any
court is the caseload brought before it, which is hard and sometimes impossible
to predict. This creates a dilemma: On the one hand, the Court and particularly
the OTP must be equipped with (at least financial) resources to react
immediately (as it would need to react, for example, to a referral of a situation
from the UN Security Council), but on the other hand the contributing states
hope to keep the budget as realistic as possible to avoid surpluses. In other
words, a contingency that is needed cannot be properly provided by a regular
budget without risking surplus.
As a remedy to this dilemma, the Court proposed to the CBF the creation of
a “Contingency Fund” that would serve as a source for additional funding over
and above the approved yearly budget. The Fund would exist as a standing
173
reserve and not be limited to a particular fiscal year. However, in designing
the Contingency Fund, the Court needed to ensure that the Prosecutor as well
as the other organs could obtain certain funding—for example, funding for
necessary investigations—without undergoing a prohibitive authorization
process. After all, such a process would risk infringing on the independence of
the Prosecutor. Thus, for three limited types of expenditures the Contingency
Fund was made accessible upon mere notification to the CBF (but without the
requirement of the Committee’s prior authorization): (1) costs associated with
an unforeseen situation following a decision by the Prosecutor to open an
investigation, (2) unavoidable expenses for developments in existing situations
that could not be foreseen or could not be accurately estimated at the time of
adoption of the budget, and (3) costs associated with an unforeseen meeting of
174
the ASP. To date, the ICC is the only international court with such an
instrument. All other institutions draw on their regular budgets or on
extrabudgetary funds raised on an as-needed basis. As an example, upon
apprehension of Mr. Radovan Karadžić, and later again when Mr. Radko
Mladić was arrested, the ICTY was forced to submit supplementary budgets to
the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly in order to secure adequate
funding to carry out the highly resource-intensive proceedings against the two
accused in addition to the workload anticipated in the ICTY’s biennial budget.

172. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 3d Sess., Sept. 6–10, 2004, Report of the
Committee on Budget and Finance, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/3/8 (Aug. 13, 2004), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-18-_CBF_report_English.pdf.
173. Id. ¶ 28.
174. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Programme Budget for 2005, Contingency
Fund, Working Capital Fund for 2005, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of the
International Criminal Court and Financing of Appropriations for the Year 2005, Res. 4, ICC Doc. ICCASP/3/Res.4 (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICCASP-ASP3-Res-04-ENG.pdf; see also Int’l Criminal Court, FRR, supra note 11, at regulation 6.6.
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In practice, when extraordinary and unbudgeted needs arise during the year,
the Registrar of the Court submits a detailed supplementary budget notification
to the CBF through its chairperson, specifying the maximum amount that could
175
be required until year end. However, in practice the Court will only withdraw
money from the Fund once it has implemented one hundred percent of its
regular budget.
It was not until 2010 that the Contingency Fund was actually needed by the
Court. In all previous years, the budget had not been utilized to its full extent.
The implementation rates generally grew over those years, with an overall
budget implementation of 81.4% in 2004, 83.4% in 2005, 79.6% in 2006, 90.5%
in 2007, 93.3% in 2008, and 95% in 2009.
In 2010, the overall expenditures, which included the Court’s use of the
Contingency Fund, amounted to €107.4 million, or €754,000 above the approved
budget. In 2011, the Court’s expenditures exceeded the approved budget by
176
€3.8 million. In 2013, this expense, together with the excess expenditures of
the previous year, substantially reduced the amount available for unforeseen
operations of the Court. In its budget resolution at the tenth assembly meeting
in December 2011, the Assembly decided to replenish the Fund up to the
threshold of seven million euros—three million euros below the Contingency
177
178
Fund’s original level. A similar practice was upheld in 2012. Should it turn
out that the Court uses the resources of the Contingency Fund during a year,
the Court’s budgetary implementation rate at year’s end will determine whether
179
funds will have to be withdrawn from the Contingency Fund or not. However,

175. Int’l Criminal Court, FRR, supra note 11, at regulation 6.7. Note that the term “detailed” was
only inserted into the provision by Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Programme Budget
for 2011, the Working Capital Fund for 2011, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of
the International Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for 2011 and the Contingency Fund, Res. 4,
pt. VI, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/9/Res.4 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-9-Res.4-ENG.pdf.
176. The expenditures totalled €107.4 million, instead of the €103.6 million approved.
177. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Programme Budget for 2012, the Working
Capital Fund for 2012, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of the International
Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for 2012 and the Contingency Fund, Res. 4, pt. E, ICC Doc.
ICC-ASP/10/Res.4 (Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Programme Budget for 2012],
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-10-Res.4-ENG.pdf;
see also Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Programme Budget for 2010, the Working
Capital Fund for 2010, scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of the International
Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for the Year 2010, the Contingency Fund, Conversion of a
GTA Psychologist Post to an Established One, Legal Aid (Defence) and the Addis Ababa Liaison
Office, Res. 7, pt. E, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/Res.7 (Nov. 26, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-8-Res.7-ENG.pdf.
178. Int’l Criminal Court, Programme Budget for 2013, supra note 168, pt. F.
179. See Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 12th Sess., Nov. 20–28, 2013, Report of the
Committee on Budget and Finance on the Work of its Twenty-First Session, ¶¶ 22–27, ICC Doc. ICCASP/12/15 (Nov. 4, 2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-15ENG.pdf. For 2013, the Court did not have to access the Contingency Fund due to an implementation
rate lower than 100%, allowing the Court to “back-fill” the Contingency Fund through unspent regularbudget resources.
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in the current financial climate, the risk of increasing reluctance among states to
replenish the Contingency Fund is becoming ever more real.
(3) The Court: budget driven or mandate driven? Linked to the
question of whether the ICC should have financial flexibility is the more
general question of whether the Court should act as a demand-driven or a
resource-driven institution. Applying the former principle would mean that the
Court would react to any situation falling within its mandate and that additional
resources would have to be provided as needed. By contrast, a resource-driven
approach would mean that the Court would—in the worst case—have to ignore
situations and cases or at least postpone their investigation, prosecution, and
trial proceedings until such time as the required resources become available.
The Statute of the Court would appear to give a clear answer to this question—
namely, that its budget should be driven by its activities. The preamble
stipulates that the States Parties to the Statute are “[d]etermined to put an end
to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole] and thus to contribute to the prevention of
180
such crimes.” Further, the Rome Statute’s regulatory framework regarding
181
182
jurisdiction and admissibility, as well as the Prosecutor’s investigative
183
mandate, are based on the premise that the Court determines the level of its
activities based on the following factors: (1) whether a crime of sufficient
gravity been committed, (2) whether the Court has jurisdiction over the
184
crime(s) allegedly committed, and (3) whether the case is admissible. The
Statute leaves no room for budgetary considerations in this context, but rather
seems to suggest that the Court’s budgetary calculations should be guided by
these underlying statutory assumptions.
The Court’s budgetary situations in 2011, 2012, and 2013, however, have
demonstrated that the issue of resources increasingly affects the Court’s
strategic considerations. At a time when states issue austere domestic budgets
and cut out-of-state spending—and their contributions to international
organizations in particular—the Court cannot remain unaffected. This reality
together with the fact that the Court increasingly reaches regular-budget
implementation rates approximating one hundred percent due to its rather
185
conservative budgeting philosophy render the Contingency Fund the last
guarantor of the Court’s flexibility. The Contingency Fund allows the Court to
react to judicial developments despite the absence of regular budget funds, and
thus to remain true to its mission: to fight impunity without pecuniary caveat.
180. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶¶ 4–5.
181. See id. at art. 13.
182. See id. at art. 17.
183. See id. at arts. 14 & 15.
184. Otto Triffterer, Article 1: The Court, in COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 49, 59–60, ¶ 22.
185. See Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2012 of
the International Criminal Court, ¶ 12, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/10/10 (July 21, 2011), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-10-ENG.pdf.
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Therefore, although not mentioned in the Court’s legal framework, the
resources available to the Court will ultimately influence its workload. The first
Prosecutor of the ICC reflected on the reality of limited resources in his first
186
policy paper in 2003. According to the policy in the paper, which has only
187
recently been supplemented and updated by the OTP’s new Strategic Plan, the
limited resources at the OTP’s disposition require it to focus investigations on
those who bear the greatest responsibility, while at the same time making every
effort to strengthen national proceedings. The need for capacity building and a
proactive approach to the principle of complementarity is today commonly
188
recognized.
Although the current economic reality and the financial situation of the
States Parties must be accepted, the risk that the only permanent criminal court
in the world suffers from a lack of resources, just as many domestic courts do,
leaves one with mixed feelings. The Court’s funding troubles might lead to a
vicious circle where cases become admissible before the ICC precisely because
domestic judicial systems are—as a result of a lack of resources—unable to
investigate and prosecute the relevant crimes, and yet the Court is likewise
unable to try these cases for the very same reason. Put another way, the Court’s
lack of funding might lead to an impunity gap. This puts an enormous burden
on the Prosecutor who ultimately might have to explain to a victim community
that she is unable to bring to justice those who have murdered hundreds of
community members because somewhere else thousands of members of
another community have also been killed. This example shows that a strictly
resource-driven Court faces consequences that may not have been in its
founders’ minds. The Contingency Fund is a remedy to ensure the judicial
ability to react at all times to emerging situations. It needs to be preserved and
its funds must be very carefully spent—under the tight rein and scrutiny of the
CBF.
(4) Application of the UN Common System of Salaries. Following the
Preparatory Commission’s deliberations and recommendation that the Court be
part of the UN Common System and that it join the United Nations Joint Staff
189
Pension Fund (UNJSPF), the Assembly recommended that the Court

186. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b2560aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf.
187. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN JUNE 2012–2015 (2013) [hereinafter OFFICE
OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/st
atement/Documents/OTP%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf; see also OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, DRAFT
POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS (2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/9FF1EAA1-41C4-4A30-A202174B18DA923C/282515/OTP_Draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf.
188. See generally ACTIVE COMPLEMENTARITY: LEGAL INFORMATION TRANSFER (Morten
Bergsmo ed., 2011), available at http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_8_Web.pdf.
189. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Inter-Sess., Mar. 11–15, 2002,
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participate in the UNJSPF in accordance with the pension fund’s regulations.
It requested the Registrar to take the necessary steps for the ICC to apply for
membership in the pension fund, and to conclude an agreement with the
pension fund’s board pursuant to article 3, paragraph (c), of the regulations of
the fund.
The alignment of the Court’s salary structure with the UN Common System
has not been disputed in the first years, and consequently the Staff Rules
prescribe that the salaries should be paid in conformity with the UN Common
191
System. In 2012, some States Parties questioned this, with a view to reducing
the Court’s expenditures on salaries, and requested an examination of whether
192
this system includes discretionary elements. This development was of high
concern for the Court and was perceived as putting the Court at a significant
risk. It is legitimate for the Court’s stakeholders to request that discretionary
benefits be reduced or cancelled in order to alleviate the financial burden.
However, the question of whether the conditions of service under the UNCommon-System scheme are overgenerous in times of financial austerity must
be discussed with the UN and the International Civil Service Commission
(ICSC), not with an individual international organization that applies this
scheme as the result of the expressed will of all its member states. A unilateral
deviation from this system—in particular on a nondiscretionary item—not only
would be legally questionable (at least, the Assembly would have to alter the
Staff Rules and Regulations), but also would be fatal for the Court because it
would make the only permanent international criminal court in the world a
second-class employer. The Court would be offering less favorable conditions of
service than the two UN ad hoc Tribunals as well as the Mechanism for
193
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), the most immediately comparable
institutions, or any other UN mission or agency applying the UN Common
System. In short, the ICC would run the risk of deterring the best available
talent.

Provisional Internal Rules and Regulations of the International Criminal Court: Inter-Sessional Meeting
of Experts Held at The Hague From 11 to 15 March 2002, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/INF/2, annex I
(Mar. 21, 2002).
190. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Participation of the
International Criminal Court in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, ICC Doc. ICCASP/1/Decision 3 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://legal.un.org/icc/asp/1stsession/report/english/
annex_iii_e.pdf.
191. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 4th Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 3, 2005, Staff Rules of
the International Criminal Court (Annex to ICC/AI/2005/003), rs. 103.2 & 103.3, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/4/3
(Aug. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Staff Rules], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/vademecum/vademecum/Staff%20Rules.pdf. As the
Staff Rules were approved by the Assembly of States Parties, so was the alignment with the UN
Common System.
192. Int’l Criminal Court, Programme Budget for 2012, supra note 177, pt. I.
193. The UN Security Council established the MICT on December 22, 2010, “to carry out a number
of essential functions of the [ICTR and the ICTY] after the completion of their respective mandates” in
July 2012 and July 2013, respectively. About, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM.
TRIBUNALS, http://www.unmict.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
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As a member organization of the pension fund, the Court has assumed all
obligations and responsibilities under the UNJSPF regulations, including the
obligation to adhere to the common standards, methods, and arrangements that
are applied to salaries, allowances, and benefits for international civil-service
194
staff. Salaries, benefits, and pensionable remuneration scales must thus be
those in force within the Common System as determined by the ICSC and
approved by the General Assembly.
Although there is no alternative to applying the UN Common System
(because the UN Common System is the only existing worldwide scheme for
employment of international staff and has become the de facto standard for
international civil service that operates globally), the system does have some
elements that are not necessarily favorable. The system is quite rigid, and does
not allow for tools commonly used in corporate human resources, in particular
performance-based pay such as bonuses or other incentives. However, the ICC
has always striven to be effective and result-oriented in order to attract the best
candidates to the best jobs. One practical example is that the ICC does not
request a formal test if a staff member from the general service category wants
195
to apply for a position in the professional category.
Other elements such as the Court’s performance-appraisal system or the
length and conditions of contracts have been subject to managerial practice
that, again, was inspired by the practice of UN or other Common System
members. Recently, the Court has formalized these practices in Administrative
Instructions in order to create more certainty and transparency within the
196
system, which is of particular benefit to the institution’s employees.
B. Administrative Accountability of the Court Vis-à-Vis the Assembly
As previously outlined, the Registrar, being the principal administrative
197
officer, exercises his role under the authority of the President. However, there
is no direct link to the Assembly, which itself provides management oversight
198
over the President, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar. More importantly, the
199
Assembly decides on the budget for the Court, and therefore, as a practical
matter, defines the scope of activities and resources of the Court. It seems
unusual that the Assembly can exercise budgetary authority over the Court, but

194. Int’l Criminal Court, Staff Rules, supra note 191, ch. III.
195. Id. at r. 103.9.
196. See Int’l Criminal Court, Registry, Probationary Period and Performance Appraisal, ICC Doc.
ICC/AI/2013/004 (Apr. 5, 2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%
20and%20tools/vademecum/AI/Probationary%20period%20and%20performance%20appraisal.PDF
(amending Int’l Criminal Court, Registry, Duration and Extension of Fixed-term Appointments Against
Established Posts, ICC Doc. ICC/AI/2013/005 (Apr. 5, 2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/vademecum/AI/Duration%20and%20extension%20of%
20fixed-term%20appointments%20against%20established%20posts.PDF).
197. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 38(3)(a) & 43(2).
198. Id. at art. 112(2)(b).
199. Id. at art. 112(2)(c).
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has no finer tool at hand for expressing whether the President, the Registrar, or
the Prosecutor have fulfilled their respective obligations in administrative—and
in particular in financial—matters. In other words, even if matters in those areas
were to go grossly wrong, the Assembly, despite having budgetary authority and
broad oversight over the Court’s administration, has no narrower means to
correct things. It cannot, for example, replace the officials in charge where
necessary. The Assembly can only remove an official from office pursuant to
the strict criteria in article 46 of the Rome Statute. One of the article 46 criteria
is serious misconduct, and neither that article nor the corresponding rules 24
and 25 of the RPE mention administrative or financial mismanagement as
200
serious misconduct.
The discussion over many years on the creation as well as the—as of 2014,
201
effective—operationalization of an independent oversight mechanism (IOM)
may finally provide a solution. In 2013, the working group has focused not only
on procedural and practical questions regarding the establishment and general
mandate of an oversight mechanism, but in fact submitted an Operational
202
Mandate of the Independent Oversight Mechanism to the ASP. The possibility
of an investigation regarding (serious financial) mismanagement by the heads of
203
organs could arguably be covered by the IOM’s mandate.
Further ways could be found to strengthen the position of the budgetary
authority while at the same time preserving the independence of the Court and
its organs, most importantly the judicial and prosecutorial independence. One
model for such a strengthened position of the budgetary authority could be the
EU Parliament’s procedure for discharging the EU Commission (and, by
204
analogy, the directors of the EU agencies). Although the parliament does not
appoint or remove the commissioners or the directors of the EU agencies, it
can, by granting or refusing the discharge, formally confirm the legality and
205
regularity of all financial transactions and thus express its judgment that
financial management has been exercised in accordance with the legal
framework. The Parliament’s observations on financial-management legality
take on practical importance because it is the obligation of the institution under

200. Further, neither article 46 of the Rome Statute, supra note 1, nor rules 24 and 25 of the ICC
RPE, supra note 8, explicitly provide for the removal of the President from office; however, because
the President and both Vice Presidents are judges of the Judicial Divisions, the removal in their judicial
function is implicitly encompassed in those provisions. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 46; Int’l
Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 8, at rs. 24 & 25.
201. It is expected that the Independent Oversight Mechanism, foreseen in art. 112(4) of the Rome
Statute, supra note 1, will be operationalized by the ASP in its twelfth session. See Int’l Criminal Court,
Assembly of States Parties, 12th Sess., Nov. 20–28, 2013, Report to the Bureau on the Independent
Oversight Mechanism, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/12/27 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-27-ENG.pdf.
202. See id. at app., pt. II.C.
203. Id. at app., ¶¶ 27–30.
204. Council Directive 1605/2002, Financial Regulation Applicable to the General Budget of the
European Communities, art. 145, 2002 O.J. (L 248) 1, 34 (EC).
205. Id. at art. 146(2).
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206

discharge to take action on those observations.
This ensures that
recommendations of the auditors or the Parliament itself do not remain
unimplemented. After all, an official’s refusal to discharge a commissioner or
director in the wake of a parliamentary recommendation to do so would
manifest a serious mismanagement, and would consequently require action by
those in charge of removal from office or disciplinary proceedings against the
official concerned. Such a discharge procedure could be implemented in the
Financial Regulations and Rules of the Court, namely through an amendment
of financial regulation 12, which addresses the Court auditor’s financial
statements and accounts. An amendment of the Statute would arguably not be
necessary because the discharge procedure would not alter any responsibility
regarding the election and removal of Court officials.
C. Ability to Improve the Efficiency of its Judicial Proceedings
Judicial proceedings in an international criminal trial are by definition
immensely complicated. For one, they encompass elements of the world’s
leading procedural systems and philosophies. Moreover, the nature of crimes
concerned and the position of the most responsible perpetrators is often far
removed from the physical commission of crimes. This makes proceedings
complex and extensive, at times involving hundreds of witnesses, thousands of
pages of relevant documentary evidence, and a plethora of procedural issues
subject to interlocutory motions and litigation. In such an environment, it is
important that the Court retain the capacity to react to systemic problems
inherent in the procedural framework in an expedited manner in order to keep
proceedings fair, efficient, streamlined, and expeditious. One way to achieve
this would be to amend the procedural framework using the statutory means
available. Article 51 of the Rome Statute provides that the ASP is responsible
207
for adopting or amending the Court’s RPE. At the ICC, States Parties have
clearly deviated from the practice of the UN ad hoc Tribunals, where it is the
responsibility of the judges in plenary session to amend the Tribunals’ RPE. At
the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, judges have made extensive use of this statutory
208
209
right on many occasions. This has led to a dynamic and efficient refinement

206. Id. at art. 147(1).
207. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 51(2).
208. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 14; ICTY Statute, supra note 25, at art. 15; SCSL Statute,
supra note 39, at art. 14; see also Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, RPE, supra note 87,
at r. 6.
209. For example, the ICTY RPE have been amended approximately forty-seven times since their
adoption on February 11, 1994. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/136 (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). The ICTR Rules of Procedure
and Evidence have been amended more than twenty times since their adoption on June 29, 1995. See
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
Legal/RulesofProcedureandEvidence/tabid/95/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). Finally, the
SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence have been amended fourteen times since their adoption on
January 16, 2002. See SCSL, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
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of the UN ad hoc Tribunals’ as well as the SCSL’s rules, reflecting the growing
wisdom and lessons learnt from their daily application in the courtroom.
Although it is understandable that States Parties want to keep a higher level
of control over the more detailed and complex rules of procedure and evidence
applicable at the Court, with this desire comes a certain lack of flexibility. Any
change or amendment of the Rules must be proposed to the Assembly by either
a State Party, an absolute majority of the judges (which would in itself already
210
suffice for an amendment of a rule at the ad hoc Tribunals), or the Prosecutor.
Subsequently, a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly is required
211
for a change’s adoption. Because the Assembly meets in ordinary session only
once per year in November or December, any amendments can therefore be
reasonably expected only at a yearly interval, and only if all procedural steps
can be taken in time.
At the conclusion of the Court’s first criminal case in Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
and in light of the judicial and prosecutorial experience gained over the lifetime
212
of the Court, the judiciary started a systematic “lessons learnt” exercise. The
exercise is aimed at identifying potential improvements in the Statute, Rules,
Regulations, and judicial practice in order to increase the efficiency of the
Court’s judicial process as a whole. Specific conclusions and amendments to the
Court’s legal framework where necessary are likely to emerge progressively
over the years. This initiative will ensure that the Court retains the capacity to
react to perceived inefficiencies in its current procedural framework on the one
hand and to the dynamic development of international criminal law on the
other. From a practice perspective, this initiative is highly relevant because it
represents the judges’ self-reflection on their practices in and around the
courtroom to date. The classification of potential practice modifications—into
those that will require a rule change versus those that merely require a common
agreement amongst the judges affected—is reflective of the unique
environment that the Court represents. Rules and practices need to be
constantly tested for their legitimacy and effectiveness. If and when processes
are ineffective or inefficient, the institution has to find a solution, often

LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Psp%2bFh0%2bwSI%3d&tabid=176 (last amended May 31, 2012).
210. See Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, RPE, supra note 87, at r. 6 (requiring an
agreement by “not less than ten permanent Judges at a plenary meeting of the Tribunal”). Pursuant to
article 12(1) of the ICTY Statute, supra note 25, the Chambers are composed of a maximum of sixteen
permanent judges. The ICTR has a similar arrangement. See sources cited supra notes 25, 209.
211. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 51(2). However, in urgent cases, when the present rules do
not provide for a specific situation before the Court the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw up
provisional rules to be applied until adopted, amended, or rejected at the next ordinary or special
session of the ASP. Id. at art. 51(3).
212. Int’l Criminal Court, Study Group Lessons Learnt Report 2012, supra note 17; Int’l Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, 12th Sess., Nov. 20–28, 2013, Study Group on Governance: Working
Group on Lessons Learnt: Second Report of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties, annex I.A,
II.A., ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/12/37/Add.1 (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-37-Add1-ENG.pdf.
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213

involving a multitude of stakeholders. In the same vein, the current “lessons
learnt” exercise at the Court involves not only the judges as the driving force,
214
but also the OTP, the Registry, and counsel before the Court. Further, it is
215
being facilitated in close cooperation with the ASP. Finally, the exercise
represents an illustrative example of how the Court has grown into a mature
organization, analyzing its administrative, managerial, and legal practices, and
creating appropriate bodies in order to harmonize its institutional framework
with established operational practices.
IV
CONCLUSION
The Court’s legal and institutional framework provides the senior managers
of the institution with clear guidance as regards the general pillars and
foundational arrangements. However, many areas that were left unregulated at
the outset have required managerial practice over time to establish appropriate
informal structures, procedures, and modi operandi on a variety of different
topics, on both an intra- and interorgan level. Further, the Rome Statute and
other legal texts issued by the Assembly defining the Court’s institutional
framework contain some ambiguous provisions, which has left the Court with
the daunting task of finding the practically achievable arrangements that best
approximate optimal arrangements within the confines of the Rome Statute
system. Most prominently, the institutional and governance arrangements
between the organs of the Court evidence the intelligence of a managerial
practice that has made the best of its inherent features: Arrangements are often
of an informal nature, leaving the stakeholders with a sufficient degree of
flexibility to react to new challenges while at the same time fostering a
regulatory framework that may lead to a more solid codification if and when a
codification would be suitable. The specific—and managerially complex—
institutional layout of the ICC with its three organ heads involved in complex
213. For instance, the Court’s Advisory Committee on Legal Texts, which considers the details of
amendments to legal provisions applicable in the Court’s proceedings, consists of representatives from
the Judiciary, the OTP, Registry, and Counsel. See Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court,
supra note 9, at regulation 4(1).
214. Int’l Criminal Court, Study Group Lessons Learnt Report 2012, supra note 17, § I ¶ 7. The
lessons learnt initiative is facilitated and coordinated internally by the Presidency of the Court. Judge
Sang-Hyun Song, President, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement to the Committee on Juridical and
Political Affairs of the Organization of American States 7 (Apr. 12, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/pr897/
130412-ICC-President-Remarks-to-OAS.pdf).
215. The liaison between the Court and the assembly is facilitated in a separate “cluster” in the
assembly’s subgroup to its Hague Working Group, the so-called “Study Group on Governance.” See
Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Establishment of a Study Group on Governance, Res.
2, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/9/Res.2 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
Resolutions/ICC-ASP-9-Res.2-ENG.pdf; see also Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th
Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Report of the Bureau on the Study Group on Governance, ¶ 10, ICC Doc. ICCASP/11/31 (Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-31ENG.pdf.
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and multiple interrelations has evidenced over the past decade that, in the case
of a novel institution, managerial practice can be conducive to a relatively swift
definition of (near-)optimal arrangements in the many different areas of
interactions. Also, despite an occasional lack of clarity as to what the
overarching arrangement should be, managerial practice has proven to be
instrumental in keeping the Court’s operations going while the organ heads try
to sort out institutional obstacles and disagreements.
With regard to the institutional arrangements of the Court as outlined in the
Statute, managerial practice in the execution of statutory exigencies has
validated a number of underlying strategic and institutional assumptions: The
institutional and administrative independence of the Prosecutor has proven to
be preferable to the initial setup of the UN ad hoc Tribunals wherein the
Prosecutor was partially dependent on the Registry, both operationally and
administratively. The institutional setup between the President, the Prosecutor,
and the Registrar, with the latter operating under the President’s guidance and
authority, has, together with the establishment of the Coordination Council,
proven to be a better model than having a Registrar appointed by and
accountable to an authority outside the Court.
The cost of an international court is high, and growing budgets, particularly
in times of financial austerity, are of great concern for funding entities, in the
case of the ICC, the States Parties to the Rome Statute. Internal governance
and (budgetary) control tools like the management control system, the Office of
Internal Audit, and measures to increase “analytic accountability” (for instance
by providing a methodology of cost accounting and cost planning) are steps in
the right direction. However, they do not mitigate the unpleasant fact that
216
international criminal justice comes with a price tag, particularly when the
underlying legal framework requires the strict application of high legal
standards.
With the Court becoming a more and more mature institution and with a
budget implementation level nearing one hundred percent, the Court’s
flexibility depends on the availability of contingency funds. In the absence of
these funds, the Court would not be able to react in a timely manner to
situations brought before it, if it reacted at all. As desirable as the referral of yet
another situation by the UN Security Council would be for the legitimacy,
perception, and universal reach of the Court, if such a referral does not include
a cost solution it will potentially do more harm than good for the Court.
Solutions must be found in the future, and the extent of States Parties’
217
willingness to support and fund the Court will be the decisive factor.

216. Bergsmo & Harhoff, supra note 31, at 975, ¶ 12.
217. The UN General Assembly, recalling the Security Council’s referrals of situations to the
Court, invited all States to consider contributing funds to cover the Court’s investigation- or
prosecution-related expenses, including expenses in connection with situations referred to it by the UN
Security Council. Press Release, UN General Assembly, General Assembly Welcomes InterParliamentary Union’s Strengthened Support to UN; Encourages Close Cooperation in Peace and
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All in all, the Court has steadily improved structurally and performancewise over the years. Some deficiencies may already have been neutralized by
senior management, and others will continue to be a challenge for the
institution. For these remaining items, there are no quick fixes—solutions must
be well thought-out and need to be sustainable. As a principle, anyone
proposing for a change in the Court’s administrative and institutional
framework should bear the burden of proof that the proposal will improve
matters. In that regard, a simple three-prong test can be applied to all
proposals: Would their implementation allow the ICC to perform its functions
(1) quicker, (2) with higher quality results, and (3) with fewer resources? If
there is any doubt that at least one of the three elements will be met, the Court
should tread carefully. It is hoped that current efforts to improve the OTP’s
218
efficiency as well as the Registry’s current structural layout will be guided by
these criteria.
Managerial practice will remain an essential driver in optimizing processes
at the Court and in verifying whether the regulatory framework may need
amendments in order to increase performance. In particular, a dynamic
institution like the ICC with its internal and—increasingly—external pressures
and challenges needs the comfort level that comes with coordinated internal
flexibility within the boundaries of its institutional framework and statutory
mandates. Managerial practices can provide some powerful tools to achieve this
objective.

Security, Development, Human Rights, U.N. Press Release GA/11245 (May 29, 2012); see also Judge
Sang-Hyun Song, President, Int’l Criminal Court, Remarks at United Nations Security Council Open
Debate: Peace and Justice with a Special Focus on the Role of the International Criminal Court (Oct.
17, 2012).
218. See Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 12th Sess., Nov. 27, 2013, Programme
Budget for 2014, the Working Capital Fund for 2014, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of
Expenses of the International Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for 2014 and the Contingency
Fund, Res. 1, pt. H, ¶¶ 2–3, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/12/Res/1 (Nov. 27, 2013), available at http://www.iccOF
THE
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res1-ENG.pdf;
OFFICE
PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 187, ¶¶ 96–100.

